Conventions and Convictions: A Valuative Theory of Punishment by Maggen, Daniel
Utah Law Review 
Volume 2020 Number 1 Article 4 
3-2020 
Conventions and Convictions: A Valuative Theory of Punishment 
Daniel Maggen 
Yale Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maggen, Daniel (2020) "Conventions and Convictions: A Valuative Theory of Punishment," Utah Law 
Review: Vol. 2020 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2020/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Utah Law Review by an authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu. 
 235 






The one thing that most scholars of criminal law agree upon is that 
we are in desperate need of a comprehensive theory of punishment. The 
theory that comes closest to meeting this demand is the expressive account 
of punishment, yet it is often criticized for its inability to explain how the 
expression of communal values justifies punishment and why the 
condemnation of wrongdoing necessarily requires punishment. The 
Article answers these criticisms by arguing against the need to necessarily 
connect punishment to wrongdoing and by developing expressivism into a 
novel theory of punishment, grounded in the valuative function punishment 
serves. 
Offering an original interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment, the Article argues that criminal law should be understood as a 
device in the service of the individual’s interest in affirming her 
personhood, an interest that is promoted by the creation and 
communication of values. The Article posits that criminal law serves this 
purpose by safeguarding the conditions that facilitate valuative 
communication. It does so by (1) cataloging the values shared in the 
community; (2) outlining the ways in which these values are commonly 
interpreted; and (3) penalty responding to forms of behavior that hinder 
successful valuation. 
The Article concludes by examining the prohibition of abortion in 
light of the values such prohibition purports to protect, distinguishing 
between prohibitions that legitimately support the function of valuation 
and those prohibitions that serve communal values irrespective of the 
important function of valuation. The Article contends that, even if under 
certain circumstances an affront to protected values could justify the 
prohibition of abortion, the reasons for prohibition will commonly fail to 
justify the penal condemnation of those who perform or undergo it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During a town hall meeting held in Green Bay on May 2016, Donald Trump, 
then a contender in the Republican presidential primaries, made a statement that was 
met with considerable astonishment. Pressed by moderator Chris Matthews, Mr. 
Trump conceded that if abortion was outlawed, something that he would presumably 
seek to do as President, then women illegally undergoing abortion would be subject 
to punishment. This statement provoked immediate rebuke from Democrats and 
Republicans alike, quickly prompting Mr. Trump to backtrack on its penal 
conclusion.1  
Why did the move from the criminalization of abortion—hardly surprising for 
a self-proclaimed “pro-life” candidate—to its punishment draw such ire? Much of 
the answer no doubt involves election dynamics and the profound moral, 
philosophical, and political questions that surround the topic of abortion. This 
Article will, however, argue that an essential aspect of the answer also concerns the 
ambiguous connection between punishment and crime, as well as their connection 
to the values they purport to serve.2   
These connections were traditionally addressed by the retributive and 
deterrence-based justifications of punishment, yet neither has proved capable of 
comprehensively explicating them. As a result, a relatively new expressive theory of 
punishment has been put forward by various authors as an alternative understanding 
of punishment, to succeed where the traditional accounts have failed.3 The 
expressive account, which is particularly attractive to those attempting to make sense 
of the criminalization of abortion, suggests that punishment is justified as a way of 
                                                   
1 See Matt Flegenheimer & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump, Abortion Foe, Eyes 
‘Punishment’ for Women, Then Recants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, at A1.  
2 Contemporary scholarship is almost unanimous in lamenting this ambiguity. See, e.g., 
DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION, 
AND THE LAW (2005) (generally arguing against the ability to theoretically justify 
punishment); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Justifying Punishment, 14 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 161, 162 
(2001) (generally arguing for the impossibility of a coherent general justification of 
punishment); Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 42 
(1979) (noting the gap between the pervasiveness of punishment and the unavailability of a 
clear justification of punishment); J. L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3 (1982) (noting the paradoxical gap between the unavailability of a 
clear justification of punishment and its familiarity from the perspective of retributivism); 
Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment, 11 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 273, 276 (1982) (arguing that there is today no satisfactory theory of punishment).  
3 The most significant authors to write in the expressive tradition include Antony Duff, 
Joel Feinberg, Jean Hampton, and Dan Kahan. See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 
233–36 (Sydney Shoemaker et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter DUFF, TRIALS AND 
PUNISHMENTS]; Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 
(1965); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
208, 217 (1984); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 597 (1996). 
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conveying the social reprobation of actions that flout shared social values.4 
Expressivism, however, is widely criticized on two main points. First, it is often 
argued that expressivism suffers from what is known as the problem of hard 
treatment.5 A theory of punishment, according to this objection, must be able to 
explain punishment qua hard treatment, meaning the intentional infliction of 
suffering on the punishee. While expressivism can, perhaps, explain the purpose of 
punishment, it is argued that it fails to explain why such condemnation needs to take 
the form of hard treatment.6 This failure, it is argued, prevents expressivism from 
being regarded as a meaningful justification of punishment.7 
This Article will respond to this criticism by distinguishing between two modes 
of justifying punishment, based on the kind of prima facie wrong that punishment is 
thought to exhibit. Punishment, on one view, is not inherently different from other 
state actions, and the kind of justification it entails essentially requires grounding 
punishment in the kind of good that is generally promoted by the legal order.8 
Referring to this stance as the general approach to the justification of punishment, 
the Article will suggest that it is characteristic of justifications of punishment as 
diverse as Bentham’s utilitarianism and Kantian contractualism. On another view, 
to which I will refer as the special mode of justification, punishment represents a 
unique evil, surpassing the general wickedness of non-penal state action, and is 
therefore in need of a special form of justification, which ostensibly can only be 
found in its connection to another unique evil, that of crime.9 It is not enough, on 
this account, that punishment could be shown to be in the service of a generally 
desirable moral purpose; instead, the only purpose that might absolve punishment 
of its sins can be found in its inversion of crime, in backward-looking retribution or 
forward-looking crime prevention. 
The objection to expressivism for its failure to adequately address the problem 
of hard treatment comes from the direction of the special mode of justification, yet 
this Article will argue that there is no reason to heed the demands that expressivism 
adheres to the underlying premises of the special approach. After shedding light on 
some of the weaknesses of the special approach, this Article will suggest that 
expressivism is better understood as a general justification of punishment, rejecting 
the idea that there is something particularly evil about punishment that cannot be 
justified by reasons that would be equally applicable to other state actions. 
This understanding of the expressive account puts the onus of justification on 
the beneficial purpose ostensibly served by criminal law, and here it is where 
                                                   
4 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400; Kahan, supra note 3, at 596. 
5 See generally Ambrose Y.K. Lee, Defending a Communicative Theory of Punishment: 
The Relationship Between Hard Treatment and Amends, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 217 
(2017) (surveying the difficulty expressive theories have in justifying hard treatment). 
6 See, e.g., Linda Ross Meyer, Herbert Morris and Punishment, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
109, 118 (2003). 
7 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1421–22 (2000). 
8 See infra Section I.A.1. 
9 See infra Section I.A.2. 
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expressivism encounters a second, more formidable objection. On the expressive 
account, punishment, and criminal law in general, are justified as a way of 
expressing social values. As some of the proponents of expressivism themselves 
admit, this purpose seems to put the expressive justification at odds with the 
fundamental tenets of liberalism, as it seems to transform the individual into an 
instrument for social progress, or, at least, make the moral stature of the individual 
overly dependent on the community she is part of.10 
After surveying some of the ways in which different proponents of 
expressivism seek to overcome this challenge, and how their failure to do so is 
affected by the unnecessary attempt to resolve the hard treatment problem, this 
Article will suggest that the expressive justification can be redeemed by viewing the 
promotion of social values as but one aspect of the more fundamental purpose of 
promoting individual valuation, in which social values are used to promote 
individual assertions of agency. 
Individuals, it will be suggested, assign value to objects as a way of asserting 
their creative agency and personhood. To validate these valuative self-assurances, 
individuals seek to communicate their values to others, whom they believe would 
accept these values in recognition of the agency of their creators. Social values, in 
this view, deserve legal protection not because of their intrinsic worth but rather 
because of their ability to contribute to the self-asserting efforts of individuals. 
Accordingly, when we come to scrutinize the legal promotion of social values, in 
general, or in criminal law, we must do so with an eye to the more fundamental 
purpose of promoting individual valuation. 
Once the shift from values to valuation is incorporated into the expressive 
theory, we can distinguish between two main ways in which criminal law promotes 
the purpose of valuation, doing so either directly or indirectly. Beginning with the 
latter, this Article will argue that criminal law can be understood as part of a general 
endeavor to facilitate the necessary conditions for the successful creation and 
communication of values.11 Criminal law does this, this Article will suggest, by 
giving voice to the values shared by members of the community, describing the ways 
in which the scope of these values is commonly understood, and prohibiting the 
creation of conditions that hinder their communication. This indirect mode of 
operation, this Article argues, is most characteristic of the protection of those aspects 
of valuation that are further from the core of self-assurance, as they are generally 
less significant for the very ability to assert one’s personhood.  
                                                   
10 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 597. 
11 There is some resemblance between this direction and Jürgen Habermas’ 
communicative theory. Habermas, however, views communication in dialectical terms, 
mediating between the individual and the community, while I see it as an immediate 
instrument of self-assertion.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 
157 (Jeremy L. Shapiro trans., Heinemann Educ. Books, 2d. ed. 1978) (1968) [hereinafter 
HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 65–66 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen trans., Mass. Inst. Tech. 1990) (1983); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 17–19 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981).   
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This Article will then proceed to argue that in addition to the general purpose 
of safeguarding social values, criminal law at times responds more directly to forms 
of behavior that negatively affect the valuative efforts of others. Here, this Article 
will suggest that rejecting the ability of others to form communicable values, by 
treating them as inferior, imposing on them judgments that are divorced from their 
self-asserting valuation, or treating them as objects, can have a direct disruptive 
effect on the ability of those thus treated to continue using valuation for the purpose 
of self-assertion. In responding to such forms of behavior with penal condemnation, 
criminal law expresses the falsity of such behavior and reassures the victim, and all 
members of the community, that their values can be validated through 
communication, despite the contrary message implicit in wrongdoer’s actions. 
The argument will proceed in several steps. Part I will situate the expressive 
account, and the problem of hard treatment from which it allegedly suffers, within 
the scholarly debate on the justification of punishment. In doing so, Part I will 
respond to the hard treatment objection by distinguishing between general and 
special forms of justification. Part I will subsequently argue that the demand for 
special justification places an unnecessary burden on the justification of punishment, 
and that heeding this demand risks leading the practice of punishment down a 
dangerous path. Part II will then explore the difficulty with the expressivist claim 
that punishment is meant to promote social values. Part II will survey three ways in 
which expressive theories attempt, and fail, to justify punishment in terms of its 
contribution to the promotion of values, using utilitarian,12 Kantian,13 and Hegelian14 
justificatory frameworks. Part III will respond to the problem of promoting values 
by introducing a shift from values to valuation. Offering an innovative reading of 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of judgment, this Part will explore the logic of 
communicative valuation and how it can be thought of as assisting the affirmation 
of personhood. Returning to the subject of punishment, Part IV will explore the ways 
in which criminal law could be explained and justified as an instrument for the 
promotion of valuation. This Part will argue that criminal law serves three main 
functions that facilitate valuative communication: the enumeration of values shared 
by members of the community; the specification of common interpretations for 
various forms of behavior with regard to the affirmation or denial of valuation; and 
the reaffirmation of values and valuation in the face of criminal behavior that flouts 
them. This Part will further distinguish between the direct and indirect ways in which 
criminal law promotes valuation, either by focusing on the disruption of valuation 
itself or on the erosion of social values. 
Finally, Part V of this Article will explore the possible criminalization of 
abortion, as it is presented in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the case of Roe v. 
Wade15 as a case of indirect legal protection of individual valuation. Viewed from 
this perspective, this Article will argue that the social values that commonly inform 
                                                   
12 See infra Section II.A. 
13 See infra Section II.B. 
14 See infra Section II.C. 
15 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the prohibition of abortion can be justified in doing so only as far as they are in the 
service of individual valuation. In addition, this Article will argue that even when 
the prohibition of abortion is justifiable in these terms, the penal condemnation of 
the women who undergo it may not be, given the distinct functions served by 
criminalization and condemnation. 
 
I.  EXPRESSIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF HARD TREATMENT 
 
A.  The Problem of Hard Treatment 
 
Up until recently, the attempts to justify the practice of punishment could be 
generally divided between those made by utilitarians, who believe that punishment 
is justified as a form of crime prevention, and retributivists, who insist that 
punishment is justified by virtue of being a just response to past wrongdoing.16 
Endless debate between these two opposing schools has led to the point of mutual 
destruction, as both views develop devastating critiques of each other.17  
In response to the failure of these traditional justifications, several influential 
scholars of criminal law have begone over the past few decades to develop an 
alternative expressive justification of punishment.18 As their name suggests, 
expressive theories maintain that punishment must be understood and justified as a 
communicative act.19 Joel Feinberg influentially set the tone for this approach by 
describing punishment as “a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either 
on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the 
punishment is inflicted.”20 The fact that punishment expresses condemnation seems 
intuitively true, almost to the degree of truism, but can this insight justify 
punishment?21   
The family of approaches that took Feinberg’s lead has mainly focused on 
punishment’s expressivity to answer this question;22 however, I believe that it would 
be more useful to address it by stressing punishment’s conventionality. In one sense 
                                                   
16 See, e.g., J.P. Day, Retributive Punishment, 87 MIND 498, 498 (1978). 
17 See, e.g., George Kateb, Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy, 74 SOC. RES. 269, 
269 (2007). 
18 This idea dates back to the work of Émile Durkheim. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL 
EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 
176–178 (Everett K. Wilson ed. & trans., Herman Schnurer trans., The Free Press of Glencoe 
1961) (1925).  
19 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 3. 
20 Id.  
21 Some indeed argue that its intuitive appeal is in fact nothing more than a form of 
unhelpful truism that fails to take us beyond the arguments made by the traditional 
justifications. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Punishment as Language: Misleading Analogy for 
Desert Theorists, 10 LAW & PHIL. 311, 319 (1991); A. J. Skillen, How to Say Things with 
Walls, 55 PHILOSOPHY 509, 511 (1980). 
22 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 1375. 
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of the word, the one most clearly used by Feinberg in the above passage, 
punishment’s conventionality concerns the medium of punishment.23 Against the 
tendency of the traditional justifications to take as their point of departure the 
familiar image of punishment as an act meant to inflict unwelcome “hard treatment” 
on the punishee,24 Feinberg suggests that this external expression of punishment is 
incidental to its more fundamental essence, which could be expressed through 
various conventional vehicles of punishment.25 I will explore the second meaning of 
punishment’s conventionality in Part II, after first exploring the main objection 
aimed at the first use of this notion.  
According to one influential line of argument, Feinberg’s appeal to the 
conventionality of the penal medium understates the centrality of hard treatment for 
punishment.26 On this view, punishment differs from other forms of expression and 
other actions in general in that it intends to cause suffering.27 Accordingly, leaving 
this fact out of the justification of punishment, or making it merely a matter of 
convention reflects, on this view, failure to justify punishment.28 While a 
condemnatory message could be conveyed through the infliction of suffering, this 
purpose could also be served in ways that do not include the infliction of suffering, 
making it superfluous.29 Given the moral depravity of the infliction of suffering, this 
objection continues, the fact that expressivism is willing to impose superfluous 
suffering makes it morally objectionable.30 
In responding to this objection, it is important to situate it within two distinct 
modes of understanding the task of justification. According to one mode of 
justification, the fact that the phenomenon of punishment commonly involves the 
intentional infliction of pain is a consideration to be addressed within the internal 
calculus of punishment: in certain instances, the suffering punishment causes would 
render punishment unjust, while at other times the suffering could be outweighed by 
the benefits punishment involves. Below, I will regard this view as the general 
                                                   
23 See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400.  
24 See, e.g., J.R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 124–27 (1980).  
25 See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 402. 
26 See, e.g., Nathan Hanna, Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism, 27 LAW 
& PHIL. 123, 134 (2008) (“Punishment, after all, treats people in ways that are wrong under 
most circumstances. Just because we can express certain things with punishment does not 
mean that doing so is justified, especially if adequate alternative means of expression are 
available”); Meyer, supra note 6, at 118 (“If there is not a necessary correlation between the 
offender’s suffering and the victim’s social reaffirmation, then why punish?”).   
27 For discussion of this idea, see Bill Wringe, Must Punishment Be Intended to Cause 
Suffering?, 16 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 863, 866 (2013). 
28 See, e.g., MATT MATRAVERS, JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT: THE RATIONALE OF 
COERCION 79 (2000). 
29 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of 
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 40 (1996) [hereinafter Duff, Penal Communications]. 
30 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 5, at 220 (“If formal convictions or purely symbolic 
punishments can communicate the censure that offenders deserve for their crimes, there 
would be no good reasons to communicate it by way of hard treatment. Doing so would 
simply be wrong.”). 
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approach to justification. In contrast, another view suggests that the fact that 
punishment involves the intentional infliction of suffering makes it a uniquely 
wicked phenomenon, in need of special justification. On this account, evident in the 
hard treatment objection, the unique evil of punishment entails that any attempt to 
defend it must be equally exceptional in its justificatory framework.31 This form of 
justification, it is often suggested, could only derive from punishment’s inverse 
connection to the crime.32 
Below I will defend the first, general mode of justification, asking whether the 
moral benefit provided by punishment is justified despite the use of hard treatment. 
The alternative special approach, I will suggest, is but one understanding of the kind 
of justification that is required of punishment; even if it is not inherently misguided, 
it certainly places an undue and dangerous burden on the practice of punishment. 
Preferring the general to the special mode of justification, I will conclude, obviates 
the need to respond to the hard treatment objection, as it is premised on the belief 
that the justification of punishment must be uniquely tied to the crime. 
 
B.  Justifying Punishment 
 
Justification means different things under different theories of punishment. As 
Mitchell Berman suggests, of the idea of justification, conceptually assumes that 
there is some prima facie cause for concern about punishment—a reason for which 
it stands in need of justification.33 Different theories of punishment, he suggests, 
differ on how they seek to go beyond this initial “demand basis.”34 Berman 
accordingly believes that we can distinguish between penal theories that seek to 
demonstrate that there are considerations that override the prima facie wrongness of 
punishment and theories that deal with it by arguing that, upon reflection, the act of 
punishment does not give rise to the demand basis in question.35 David Dolinko 
suggests another helpful distinction between theories that practice rational 
justification by articulating the logic of punishment and theories that purport to offer 
a moral justification of punishment by explaining why it is morally permissible or 
                                                   
31 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 6, at 118. 
32 See, e.g., John Tasioulas, Punishment and Repentance, 81 PHILOSOPHY 279, 296 
(2006). 
33 See Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 265 (2008). 
34 Id. 
35 Berman correctly adds that defeating the demand basis does not necessarily entail 
that the action is justified for all intents and purposes, only that “it imposes no further 
obligation” on its proponent. Id. “This,” he suggests, “is not to say that the practice is thereby 
rendered justified, or even justifiable, all things considered. Maybe it is, maybe not. The 
more modest (yet significant) upshot is only that the practice no longer stands, 
embarrassedly, ‘in need of justification.’” Id. David Dolinko likewise notes the limited 
justificatory force of this form of justification. See David Dolinko, Retributivism, 
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 521 
(1997) [hereinafter Dolinko, Retributivism]. 
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desirable to engage in punishment.36 A third distinction is inspired by H.L.A. Hart’s 
suggestion that we can differentiate between the distribution of punishment and its 
imposition.37 
Another distinction I wish to pursue in this Section, related to the previous 
three, is one between general and special modes of justification. I will suggest that 
for those theories that take the general approach to justification, the demand basis of 
punishment is no different from the one raised by state action in general, at least not 
categorically so.38 Viewed from this perspective, the justification of punishment 
primarily requires elucidating the beneficial purpose that punishment purportedly 
promotes and explaining why this purpose overrides or erases the initial ground for 
objection. 
In contrast to the general theories, and often in response to their shortcomings, 
various special modes of justification seek to narrow the scope of inquiry from state 
action in general to the justification of punishment.39 For these theories, punishment 
involves a unique evil, mirroring the evil of criminal wrongdoing.40 It is not enough, 
on these views, to show that punishment is beneficial; instead, the unique evils of 
punishment can only be atoned by an equally unique benefit, derived from its 
response to crime.41 
 
1.  General Justification 
 
One of the clearest examples for the general approach to the justification of 
punishment comes from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, particularly when it is 
contrasted with J.S. Mill’s utilitarian approach to punishment. For Bentham, the 
justification of punishment is mostly subsumed under the general justificatory 
                                                   
36 David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 539 (1991). 
37 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 8–9 (2nd ed. 2008).  
38 See Section I.B.1. 
39 See Section I.B.2. 
40 See, e.g., R.A. Duff & D. Garland, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in A 
READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 2–3 (R.A. Duff & D. Garland eds., 1994) (“[Punishment] is 
morally problematic because it involves doing things to people that (when not described as 
punishment) seem morally wrong.”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction, in PUNISHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION 1 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1995) (“If locking human beings in cages 
or killing them is not a bad way to treat people, it is hard to imagine what would be.”); 
Christopher Ciocchetti, Wrongdoing and Relationships: An Expressive Justification of 
Punishment, 29 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 65, 68 (2003) (arguing that the kind of justification 
punishment requires derives from the fact that it essentially constitutes the same behavior 
that criminal law proscribes); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal 
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 310 (2004) (suggesting that punishment is in need 
of justification because of its resemblance to wrongdoing). 
41 “The deep intuition that a punishment should follow a crime, and should be limited 
by the offender’s subjective malice,” Linda Ross Meyer thus observes, “is a grounding 
principle of both criminal law and everyday morality.” Meyer, supra note 6, at 109. 
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framework of the state.42 Punishment, for Bentham, is primarily an expression of 
governance, in need of justification because of its interference with the choices and 
preferences of those subject to it.43 Hence, if punishment qua state action is to be 
justified, such imposition must show itself to be motivated by objectively valid 
considerations.44 “The immediate principle end of punishment,” Bentham writes, “is 
to control action”;45 accordingly, “[t]he business of government is to promote the 
happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.”46 Notwithstanding all other 
considerations, punishment, like all state action, is justified according to Bentham 
when properly guided by the general principle of utility. 
Bentham, of course, also recognizes that punishment is distinct from rewards 
in that it seeks to control action through the production of suffering.47 “All 
punishment is mischief,” Bentham writes, “all punishment in itself is evil.”48 
However, despite its added mischievousness, the justifiability of punishment, like 
that of all state action, depends on its accordance with the general felicific calculus: 
“[u]pon the principle of utility, if it ought be at all be admitted, it ought only to be 
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”49 To put it in other 
words, because punishment’s justification as a means of control is contingent on its 
conformity with the principle of utility, the fact that it produces suffering merely 
implies that it can be justified only when and if this suffering is offset by other 
pleasures it creates. Although, as Bentham notes, there are good reasons for which 
punishment could only be justified in response to crime, there is nothing inherent in 
the justification of punishment that makes this connection necessary.50  
This aspect of the Benthamian justification of punishment is often seen as 
grounds for objection, precisely for its inability to insist that it is inherently wrong 
to apply punishment irrespective of crime.51 According to its critics, this form of 
utilitarianism, we can call it general for our purposes, is faulted for its willingness 
to take into account various considerations beyond the wrongdoer’s guilt, so that in 
principle, there may very well be occasions in which the general utilitarian 
recommends punishment even in the absence of guilt.52  
                                                   
42 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 75 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996). 
43 See id. at 287.  
44 See id. at 18. 
45 Id. at 164. 
46 Id. at 74. 
47 See id. at 158. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Fredrich Rosen, Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent: The 
Origins of a False Doctrine, 9 UTILITAS 23, 25 (1997). 
51 See, e.g., Igor Primorac, Utilitarianism and Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent, 38 
ANALYSIS 194, 195–96 (1978) (juxtaposing the utilitarian justification and the logic of the 
Soviet show trials). 
52 For these objections, see, for example, S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of 
Punishment, 33 PHILOSOPHY 325, 331 (1958) (discussing the more categorical objections to 
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Without taking full stock of this argument and the various ways in which 
Benthamians respond to it, it should be noted that the “generality” of this account is 
also a substantial factor weighing against disregarding culpability. As we recall, 
punishment’s success on this account depends on the kind of fear it induces: ideally, 
would-be wrongdoers’ fear of being subjected to hard treatment. The intentional 
infliction of pain on the innocent—“telishment,” as John Rawls terms it—not only 
needlessly amplifies the suffering caused by punishment by spreading it to those 
who are not would-be criminals, but also diminishes the effectiveness of the threat 
aimed at those who are.53 Of course, the adverse effects of telishment are contingent 
on the public knowing that innocent people are being telished, but any utilitarian 
contemplating it must contend with the inevitable possibility of the telishment 
becoming publicly known.54 Given the wide variety of means of control at the 
general utilitarian’s disposal, including punishments and rewards alike, it seems 
highly unlikely that she would opt for the risky practice of telishment.55   
Another important example of the difference between the general and the 
special modes of justification is manifested by the difference between retributivism, 
a form of justification often attributed to Immanuel Kant, and Kant’s actual views 
on legal punishment.56 Kant today is often mentioned as one of the main protagonists 
of retributivism, mainly because of several passing notes he has in which he 
passionately promotes this view.57 Nevertheless, a more in-depth examination of 
Kant’s writing makes it obvious that such notions cannot coexist with his more 
                                                   
the utilitarian justification); Igor Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 64 PHILOSOPHY 187, 
187–88 (1989) (objecting to the utilitarian justification in general terms).   
53 For Rawls’ description of this term, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. 
REV. 3, 11–12 (1955). For others who likewise answer this objection, see Guyora Binder & 
Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 
115, 133 (2000); William Lyons, Deterrent Theory and Punishment of the Innocent, 84 
ETHICS 346–48 (1974); George Schedler, Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?, 63 
MONIST 185, 186 (1980). 
54 See, e.g., Pearl, supra note 2, at 280–86 (discussing the risk of telishment becoming 
known). 
55 Characterizing punishment as a means of control, however, exposes Benthamian 
utilitarianism to a different, much more penetrating objection, for its dehumanization of its 
citizenry, an objection often associated with Hegel. See Duff, Penal Communications, supra 
note 29, at 13–14 (discussing the Hegelian objection).  
56 For discussion of this discrepancy, see, for example, George P. Fletcher, The Nature 
and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 695–97 (2000); Thomas E. Hill Jr., 
Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 LAW & PHIL. 407, 409 (1999); Jeffrie G. 
Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 512–18 (1987). 
57 See, e.g., Blumoff, supra note 2, at 168 (“All recent [retributive] theorists start with 
Kant.”); M. Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 6 LAW & 
PHIL. 28, 39 (1987) (grounding the retributive argument in the kind of respect persons are 
due); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & 
JUST. 55, 59–61 (1992) (identifying retributivism with Kant). 
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overarching transcendental treatment of autonomy and human dignity.58 Instead, the 
question of legal punishment is appended by Kant to the more general puzzles of 
political dominion.59  
For Kant, the justification of political authority rests on two arguments. First, 
given the metaphysical nature of human freedom, Kant believes that no state action 
(or any physical action for that matter) can negatively or positively affect an 
individual’s autonomy.60 As a result, what political control requires is not 
justification but rational reasons.61 From here, Kant continues to argue that a well-
ordered legal system, as a whole, promotes legal freedom by making it more 
                                                   
58 See, e.g., ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
PENAL JUSTICE 42–45 (2009) (arguing that Kantian formalism cannot positively justify 
punishment); Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Principle of Justice as Categorical Imperative of Law, 
in KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY RECONSIDERED 149, 153 (Yirmiyahu Yovel ed., 1989) 
(noting that Kantian freedom cannot be protected by law); Peter Benson, External Freedom 
According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 576 (1987) (discussing the difficulties that result 
from the gap between Kant’s moral theory and his legal theory); Hill, supra note 56, at 409 
(noting that Kant’s thesis concerns “our liability to suffer in the recognition of our own 
misdeeds, not our right or duty to make others suffer for theirs.”); Marcus Willaschek, Why 
the Doctrine of Right Does Not Belong in the Metaphysics of Morals: On Some Basic 
Distinctions in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 5 JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK 205, 208–11, 
224 (1997) (discussing the gap between Kantian morality and law). 
59 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in 
TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTROY 17 
(Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006) [hereinafter Kant, What Is 
Enlightenment]; Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 215, 224 (1987). 
60 As Kant puts it at some point, even when one is stretched on the torturer’s wheel, she 
does not lose one iota of her freedom—for if that were the case, it would render her less 
worthy of respect:  
 
No man can be pathologically compelled, because of freewill. Human choice is 
arbirium liberum, in that it is not necessitated per stimulus; if a man, for example, 
is forced to an action by numerous and cruel tortures, he still cannot be compelled 
to do these things if he does not will it; he can, after all, withstand the torture. . . . 
In a free being an action can be practically necessary, and that in a high degree, 
which simply cannot be surpassed – and yet it does not contradict freedom.  
 
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 59–60 (J.B. Schneewind ed., Peter Heath trans., 
1997). For more on this aspect of Kant’s conception of freedom, see Onora S. O’Neill, 
Agency and Anthropology in Kant’s Groundwork, in KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
RECONSIDERED 63, 74 (Yirmiyahu Yovel ed., 1989); Henry E. Allison, The Concept of 
Freedom in Kant’s “Semi-Critical” Ethics, 68 ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE 
96, 105 (2009). In his legal writing the separation between the moral domain of freedom and 
the legal domain is manifested in his assertion that legal norms create no moral obligation. 
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 24–25 (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1996) 
[hereinafter KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].  
61 See, e.g., Kant, What Is Enlightenment, supra note 59, at 133. 
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effectual.62 The combination of these two arguments eventually leads Kant to 
develop an account of state authority that is remarkably similar to the Hobbesian 
model of the social contract.63 According to this explanation, the law represents a 
formal agreement about the rights of individuals, ensuring that they are secure from 
the interference of others in their earthly endeavors.64 Punishment, in this view, is 
justified in light of its contribution to this desirable state of affairs, underscoring the 
legal rights that ensue from the social agreement.65  
                                                   
62 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 60, at 92–93. For discussion 
of Kant’s theory of law and punishment that are in line with his general conception of 
freedom, see, for example, Murphy, supra note 56, at 516–18, 521; Igor Primorac, Is 
Retributivism Analytic?, 56 PHILOSOPHY 203, 203–11 (1981); Mark Tunick, Is Kant a 
Retributivist?, 17 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 60, 66–67 (1996). Likewise, for neo-Kantians such 
as John Rawls, a theory of law is meant to outline the general political institutions of a “well-
ordered society,” and much less so to establish the “wrongness” of disorder or crime. See, 
e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 33, 161 (1991) (admitting the general 
Kantian’s difficulty with distinguishing tolerable from intolerable behavior); JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 441, 472 (Expanded ed. 2005) (admitting that the meaning of a 
denial of voluntariness is “disputed” and “cannot be fully discussed.”); Seyla Benhabib, 
Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theatre of Discursive Communication, in LIBERALISM 
AND THE MORAL LIFE 149 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (noting the limited ability of 
general public reason approaches to delineate criminality); JOSEPH RAZ, The Politics of the 
Rule of Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND 
POLITICS 370, 373 (1994) (admitting that demarcating the protected scope of voluntariness 
is a difficult problem while denying the need to address it); Onora O’Neill, Political 
Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 106 
PHIL. REV. 411, 422 (1997) (criticizing Rawls’ inability to deal with those who disagree with 
the community’s values); John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1987) (viewing the subject matter of a conception of justice as working 
out the “‘basic structure’ of modern constitutional democracy,” meaning “society’s main 
political, social and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified scheme 
of social cooperation.”); John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 
515, 520 (1980) (explaining that the original position serves its role by “modeling the way 
in which the citizens in a well-ordered society, viewed as moral persons, would ideally select 
first principles of justice for their society.”). 
63 See, e.g., Tom Sorell, Punishment in a Kantian Framework, in PUNISHMENT AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 10, 22–23 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (discussing the Hobbesian 
foundation of Kant’s theory of law). 
64 See KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 60, at 40–46; Robert B. Pippin, 
Mine and Thine? The Kantian State, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT AND MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY 416, 416–20 (Paul Guyer ed., 2006).  
65 Many have discussed Kant’s idea of punishment as a formal vindication of law. See, 
e.g., B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RIGHT: A 
COMMENTARY 264 (2010); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 300–24 (2009); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: 
DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 51–53 (1985) 
(discussing how a “morally neutral fashion” response would “depreciate the importance of 
the rights” that criminal conduct had infringed on); B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of 
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These examples present us with a justification of punishment that 
acknowledges but downplays the demand basis of punishment. Punishment, 
according to this approach, is a coercive practice, and as such, it must be used for 
good purposes, but in this, it is no different from other state actions. As is the case 
with other state actions, the pursuit of these purposes often lays constraints on the 
use of punishment: both the promotion of utilitarian wellbeing and Kantian political 
freedom preclude, for instance, the use of telishment, for reasons that are internal to 
the purposes they serve. 
 
2.  Special Justification 
 
The shift from a general to a special approach to justification is clearly evident 
in J.S. Mill’s departure from Bentham’s utilitarianism. Bentham, as we recall, places 
internal constraints on the use of punishment for the production of happiness, yet he 
does not categorically limit the purpose of punishment to crime prevention.66 In 
contrast, for Mill and his contemporary followers Bentham’s general appeal to a 
simple, felicific, calculus, employing a unitary notion of pleasure as its driving 
engine, is an affront to human liberty, the value of which, they believe, is 
incommensurate with lesser sources of pleasure.67 Consequently, for authors in the 
Millian tradition, best exemplified in his famous harm principle, punishment 
represents a unique threat to liberty, so it can only be legitimately used to prevent 
the equal threat of crime, meaning behavior that likewise threatens the liberty of 
others.68  
                                                   
Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in Its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151, 180–
81 (1989). 
66 See BENTHAM, supra note 42, at 156–74. 
67 John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM 14 (2nd ed. 1864) (stating that Mill, who strove to 
put a more humane face on Bentham’s utilitarianism, contends that not all pleasures are cut 
from the same cloth and that the contribution of some higher forms of pleasure to one’s 
overall happiness is incommensurate with that of lower pleasures. It is better, Mill argues, to 
be a “Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”); see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 17–18, 65–66 (Alan Ryan ed., Penguin Classics 2006) (1859) 
[hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY] (noting that paramount among these pleasures is the exercise 
of personal liberty, for this represents pleasure of a uniquely human form, transcending the 
immediate brutishness of pleasure and pain: “He who lets the world, or his own portion of 
it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of 
imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.”); see also JOEL 
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 35, 116 (1984) 
(addressing contemporary equation of wrongdoing with coercion) [hereinafter FEINBERG, 
HARM TO OTHERS]; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 28–30 (1986); SUSAN MENDUS, TOLERATION AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 51–55 
(1989); Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 
179, 192 (1969). 
68 For Mill, the problem is that the majority of people are conformists, who do not value 
individuality and therefore seek to repress any signs of individualism that disturb the 
consensus. See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 18, 65–66. On the unique meaning of 
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As Joel Feinberg, a contemporary Millian maintains, the uniqueness of 
punishment is a result of its coerciveness, so profoundly connected to liberty that the 
absence of coercion defines the meaning of liberty itself.69 Although human freedom 
is constrained in many ways, physically, biologically, psychologically, and socially, 
the Millian approach views punishment and crime as distinctly coercive limitations 
of liberty.70 This shared distinctiveness, they believe, means that punishment could 
only be justified by virtue of its ability to deter crime.71 For this reason, while the 
state is free to exercise control over the individual in order to promote various 
utilitarian ends, it can only do so as long it does not do so coercively, i.e., through 
punishment.72 
Unfortunately, Mill never quite gets to explaining why the coerciveness of 
punishment and crime is so markedly different from the other ways in which 
individual liberty is restricted.73 Like Mill, contemporary authors who justify 
                                                   
liberty for Mill’s harm principle, see MENDUS, supra note 67, at 51–55; Berlin, supra note 
67, at 179, 192. 
69 As Feinberg puts it: 
 
Not all forms of constraint and compulsion are of equal interest to the social and 
political philosopher. If there is a special kind of freedom that deserves to be 
called “political freedom” or “liberty,” it must consist in the absence of that one 
special kind of constraint called coercion, which is the deliberate forceful 
interference in the affairs of human beings by other human beings. 
 
JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 7 (Elizabeth Beardsley & Monroe Beardsley eds., 
1973) [herenafter FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY].  
70 See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 18, 22–63. For a discussion of this aspect 
in Mill’s thought see, for example, David Edwards, Toleration and Mill’s Liberty of Thought 
and Discussion, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 87 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).  
71 MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 17.  
72 Id. at 16 (“These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, 
or persuading him, or entreating him, but not compelling him, or visiting him with any evil 
in case he do otherwise.”). 
73 Id. at 95 (stating that for Mill this demarcation involves no more than a feigned 
difficulty, easily undone by common sense). Others, however, concede that this challenge 
could hardly be shrugged. As Feinberg ultimately admits, the definition of coerciveness 
“absolutely require[s] the help of supplementary principles, some of which represent 
controversial moral decisions and maxims of justice.” JOEL FEINBERG, The Interest in Liberty 
on the Scales, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY 30, 30 (1980); see also FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 69, at 9; 
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 67, at 52; JOEL FEINBERG, Legal Paternalism, in 
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 110, 123–25 (1980); RICHARD E. 
FLATHMAN, WILLFUL LIBERALISM: VOLUNTARISM AND INDIVIDUALITY IN POLITICAL 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 62 (1992); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204–211 (1987); 
Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION 30, 33 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1972); John Horton, Toleration, Morality and Harm, in ASPECTS OF 
TOLERATION: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 113, 115 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1985); 
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punishment as a form of deterrence often assume that there is something unique 
about the way in which punishment diminishes liberty, inherently different from 
other ways in which the state can negatively affect its citizens.74  
Surprisingly, a similar approach to the justification of punishment is 
characteristic of the view commonly thought to be diametrically opposed to 
deterrence, that of retributivism.75 As noted above, despite Kant’s more general 
approach to the justification of punishment, contemporary retributivists often draw 
support from Kant’s moral theory, at times making specific reference to several 
passing comments he makes in favor of the special retributive approach.76 In 
accordance with Kant’s turn to the actor’s will as the decisive factor in the moral 
composition of her actions,77 many retributivists believe that crime and punishment 
are unique phenomena by virtue of the special kind of willing they involve, namely 
the intentional treatment of another as means to an exterior ends.78 For this reason, 
many retributivist believe that punishment could only be justified when it is directed 
at the promotion of a morally valuable end: the infliction of deserved suffering, i.e., 
suffering that mirrors the wrongdoer’s own wicked act.79 Unfortunately, like the 
Millian form of justification, retributivists commonly fail to elaborate what makes 
punishment so unique, other than asserting its necessary connection to crime—an 
avoidance for which critics such as H.L.A. Hart complain that it is either “a 
                                                   
Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 155, 
156 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).  
74 See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 42, 331–32.  
75 See, e.g., Robert A. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 381–82 (1979).  
76 See generally Hill, supra note 56 (arguing that Kant’s “mature theory of justice 
implies that the principle wrongdoers ought to suffer can have only a contingent, limited, 
and derivative role as a practical principle. This interpretation . . . is compatible with several 
famous passages where Kant seems to take a stronger retributive position.”). 
77 KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 60, 41–45. 
78 See, e.g., BRUDNER, supra note 58, at 5 (connecting the meaning of free will to the 
justification of punishment); LUCAS, supra note 24, at 124–27 (arguing that the quintessential 
feature of punishment is that it is intended to be unwelcome); Berman, supra note 33, at 267 
(“Punishment stands in need of justification both on account of the fact that it causes the 
punished person to suffer and on account of the supposed fact that, by intentionally inflicting 
suffering, it infringes an individual’s rights.”); id. at 279 (“Because wrongdoers experience 
suffering as a bad, a usual way to respect them is to not cause them pain. But insofar as they 
have exercised their wills to violate legitimate interests of others, it is also plausible that 
causing them to suffer on account of their willing respects them too.”); Falls, supra note 57, 
at 28 (seeing the voluntariness of wrongdoing as the reason for which the wrongdoer and she 
alone should be punished).  
79 Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O’Toole, American Punitiveness and Mass 
Incarceration: Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and Consequentialist Responses 
to Crime, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 477, 481 (2015). 
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mysterious piece of moral alchemy” or “the abandonment of any serious attempt to 
provide a moral justification for punishment.”80  
 
C.  Should Expressivism Be Special or General? 
 
Of the two approaches examined above, expressivism, I believe, is clearly more 
at home with the general approach to justification. For some critics, this is a sign of 
its inadequacy, but this is only so if viewed from the perspective of the special 
approach.81 Which of the two views is preferable? 
The answer to this question can benefit from a historical observation on the 
modern project of justifying punishment. At the inception of modern penology, 
Cesare Beccaria insisted that punishment can only be justified when it derives from 
“absolute necessity,” subsequently arguing that such necessity can be achieved only 
when punishment is used to prevent future crime.82 Beccaria, however, qualifies this 
notion by noting that “[t]he proposition may be made general thus: every act of 
authority between one man and another that does not derive from absolute necessity 
is tyrannical.”83 Indeed, punishment ought not to be needlessly used, but this is also 
true of any state action. The necessity of state action, penal or otherwise, need not 
be categorically restricted to any single purpose, including crime prevention; 
instead, it must be judged on its contribution to the underlying purpose of the legal 
system as a whole, be it deontological or utilitarian.  
The choice between the general and special modes of justification is not one 
between equally available views. As we saw, for both the Millian and the 
retributivist, the shared uniqueness connecting crime and punishment remains very 
                                                   
80 HART, supra note 37, at 234–35. “In the end” as Morris Cohen likewise observes, 
rather than explain how punishment derives from crime, Kant, and the retributivists who 
follow him, fall back on “the assumption that just as our moral conscience tells us that ‘Thou 
shalt not kill’ is an absolute duty for the individual, so is ‘You shall kill the murderer’ an 
equally absolute duty for the community.” Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal 
Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 992 (1940); see also MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 46 (arguing that 
without further argumentative work, “the retributive reaction would seem to be less a 
consequence of our regarding one another as capable of agency, and more a matter of appeal 
to some kind of ‘celestial mechanics’ in which every criminal action . . . deserves an ‘equal 
and opposite reaction,’ in the shape of punishment.”); Benn, supra note 52, at 327 (“what 
pass for retributivist justifications of punishment in general, can be shown to be either denials 
of the need to justify it, or mere reiterations of the principle to be justified, or disguised 
utilitarianism”); Dolinko, Retributivism, supra note 35, at 518–22 (arguing against the 
Kantian duty to punish); Hanna, supra note 26, at 123 (criticizing the questionable reliability 
and justificatory strength of the intuitions on which retributivism rests); Murphy, supra note 
56 at 523; Pearl, supra note 2, at 286–293. 
81 See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 26, at 134; Lee, supra note 5, at 220. 
82 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS: AND OTHER WRITINGS 11 
(Aaron Thomas, ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen, trans., 2008) (“As the great 
Montesquieu says, every punishment that does not derive from absolute necessity is 
tyrannical.”). 
83 Id. 
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much inexplicable. A more functional explanation of this uniqueness can, however, 
be found in the sociological meaning of punishment, as explored by René Girard. In 
his seminal depiction of “sacred violence,” Girard suggests that the belief in the 
exceptionality of crime and punishment serves an important social and 
psychological function of differentiation.84 As Girard’s brilliant analysis suggests, 
the ritualistic linking of crime and punishment has, throughout history, served as a 
way of alleviating the pressures caused by mimetic desire, doing so by creating and 
reaffirming the distinction between the sacred and the profane.85 Famously 
describing the “scapegoating mechanism” animating punishment, Girard 
demonstrates how society is founded on the ability to sublimate such volatile desires 
into moments of “sacred,” i.e., exceptional violence, first attributed to the wrongdoer 
and then to the communal response expunging and sanctifying it.86 As he observes, 
the exceptionality of crime and punishment is not a corollary of some hidden quality 
they share but, instead, represents the purpose they serve as an affirmation of order 
against the threat of blurring social boundaries.87 
In rejecting expressivism since its justification of punishment is equally 
applicable to state actions that do not involve hard treatment or respond to crime, 
the hard treatment objection essentially demands that it adheres to the special mode 
of justification. Girard’s analysis not only allows us to see the conventionality of 
this requirement, but also cautions us as to the dangers of believing that there is some 
inherent truth to it.88 Punishment surely requires justification, and given the toll it 
takes from those upon which it is inflicted and from society as a whole, there is good 
reason to demand that punishment’s justification exceeds that of non-penal state 
actions.89 Suggesting, however, that there is something exceptionally wicked about 
crime, which alone is capable of justifying punishment, risks transforming criminal 
law into a holy crusade.90  
                                                   
84 See generally RENÉ GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (Patrick Gregory trans., 
1977). 
85 See RENÉ GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT 24–44 (Yvonne Freccero trans., Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1989) (1982) [hereinafter GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT]. 
86 See GIRARD, supra note 84, at 143–68.  
87 See GIRARD, THE SCAPEGOAT, supra note 85, at 45–56. 
88 See GIRARD, supra note 84, at 1–38. 
89 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOÛS 447, 450–51 
(1992). 
90 See, e.g., Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA 
STATUTE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 257, 267 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988) (noting the 
pragmatic necessity in separating criminalization, as the decision that constitutes intolerable 
behavior, from moral epistemology); Rainer Forst, Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice, 4 PHIL. 
EXPL. 193, 195 (2001) (regarding this difficulty as the “paradox of drawing the limits” of 
toleration); John Steele, A Seal Pressed in the Hot Wax of Vengeance: A Girardian 
Understanding of Expressive Punishment, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 35, 68 (2001) (“The moral 
panics, insanity induced by demagoguery, and stubborn public vengefulness that are 
chronically associated with expressive punishment are best understood as symptoms of the 
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Against the hard treatment objection, expressivism ought to stand for the 
recognition of the conventionality of the connection between punishment and crime, 
and the important social function this connection serves. Punishment, as we will see 
in the remainder of the Article, is not some horrible weapon to be used to smite evil 
wrongdoers, but a legal tool for the promotion of a political end. The real question, 
to which I will now turn, is whether this purpose makes it justifiable. 
 
II.  EXPRESSING VALUES 
 
Punishment, the expressive theory argues, is justified as a conventional device 
for the expression of condemnation.91 In Part I, I argued that this modest form of 
justification is not, in itself, a reason to reject expressivism, but that this still gives 
us no reason for which punishment is justifiable on the expressive account. 
“‘Expression’ itself,” as A.J. Skillen rightly notes, “is no adequate ethic, any more 
than is sincerity. Some of the worst deeds have been, no doubt, sincere 
expressions.”92 Indeed, if expressivism were to merely stress the communicative 
element in punishment, it would be no more than a description of punishment, 
adding little to the traditional justifications of deterrence and retribution.93  
What expressivism adds, in fact, is the insight concerning punishment’s 
conventionality, first, as we have seen, by exposing the conventional nature of the 
means of punishment and the connection between crime and punishment, but also, 
as will be discussed below, in the idea that punishment is justified for its contribution 
to social conventions, embodied in the community’s values.94 As Dan Kahan 
observes, the suggestion that punishment expresses values ultimately sets the 
expressive theory apart from other theories of punishment:  
                                                   
archaic scapegoating mechanism . . . .”); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments 
Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 774 n.198 (1998). 
91 Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400. 
92 Skillen, supra note 21, at 521. 
93 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 15, at 1357–76 (“Morality is surely plural and complex 
– it incorporates a wide variety of moral factors, such as overall well-being, equality, status 
and self-respect, deontological constraints, the factors of desert and responsibility, and other 
factors that, in various ways, may seem to involve linguistic meaning – but in every case the 
purportedly express factor turns out to be nonexpressive.”); Davis, supra note 21, at 311, 319 
(arguing that expressivism inherits the problems of retributivism); Erik Luna, Punishment 
Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 
205, 218–19 (2003) (equating expressivism with retributivism); Primoratz, supra note 52, at 
202 (arguing that expressivism is torn between retributive and utilitarian arguments); Skillen, 
supra note 21, at 511 (arguing that expressivism is merely a “spiritual form of retributivism,” 
and that expressivism is a mix between retributivism and utilitarianism, exacerbating the 
difficulties both invoke).  
94 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420 
(1999) (punishment signals “society’s commitment to the values that the wrongdoer’s act 
denies.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2028 (1996) (punishment speaks “on behalf of the nation’s basic principles and 
commitments.”).  
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[d]eterrence justifies punishment to prevent harm to others; retributivism 
confines it to those who voluntarily choose to inflict such harm. The 
expressive theory, by contrast, appears to emphasize neither consequences 
nor choices, but rather the enforcement of society’s moral values.95 
  
The real question expressivism has to account for, therefore, is whether it is 
justifiable to enforce society’s values through punishment96 As described below, 
expressive authors usually address this question in utilitarian, Kantian, and Hegelian 
terms. 
 
A.  The Utility of Expressing Values 
 
For some authors, the benefits produced by the penal expression of values are 
primarily factors to be taken into consideration when deciding whether the projected 
beneficial consequences of punishment outweigh the expenses and suffering it is 
likely to produce.97 According to this view, the expression of values can have various 
beneficial implications: it can increase social cohesion, facilitate collaboration, 
decrease—or enliven—social conflicts, and the like.98 Feinberg thus argues that “the 
condemnatory aspect of punishment [serves] a socially useful purpose,” which for 
him includes authoritative disavowal, symbolic non-acquiescence, vindication of the 
law, and absolution of others.99 Rather than argue that expressivism justifies 
punishment as such, these authors rely on the traditional utilitarian justification to 
argue that without understanding the expressive ways in which criminal law and 
punishment operate, any attempt to use them to produce desirable results would 
likely miss the target.100 
The main problem with this approach is its evident social relativism.101 
Punishment, this view seems to imply, serves an important social function in its 
support of social values, regardless of the form and substance of these values. In 
                                                   
95 Kahan, supra note 3, at 596; see also Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments 
Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions 
Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2206–15 (2001); Tasioulas, supra note 32, at 296. 
96 Skillen, supra note 21, at 521 (asking the question expressivism needs to answer is 
“which values should have acceptance and priority and therefore be expressed?”). 
97 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1513 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Punishment 
Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 692–93 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 94, 
2029–30. 
98 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 94, at 485–92 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of 
the criminal reification of social conflicts); Sunstein, supra note 94, at 2029–30 (assessing 
the utilitarian benefits of criminal value-expression). 
99 Feinberg, supra note 3, at 420.  
100 See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 97, at 1516; Feinberg, supra note 3, at 404–
08; Sunstein, supra note 94, at 2029–30. 
101 Skillen, supra note 21, at 519.  
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appealing to utilitarian arguments, expressivists who hold this view risk ignoring the 
difference between promoting liberal and illiberal, just and unjust values.102 This 
color-blindness is an inherent feature of utilitarianism, translating all questions of 
value into considerations of utility, but the moral challenge it presents us with is 
exacerbated by coupling it with the idea that regardless of their substance, the 
promotion of values through punishment could be justified out of utility.103 
 
B.  Expressing the Right Values 
 
In response to the concern of moral relativism, some authors suggest that 
punishment is justified not for the promotion of values as such but for the expression 
of the right values, commonly understood in Kantian terms.104 Specifically, these 
authors often frame crime and punishment in terms of their relation to the value of 
equality.105 Jean Hampton, for example, writes that punishment  
 
is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the victim 
denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that 
not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but 
does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.106  
 
Essential to this approach is the idea that the evil of the wrongdoer’s deed lies 
in her denial of her equality to the victim, effectively diminishing the victim’s worth 
to elevate her own.107 In this view, crimes are evil due to their negative effect on the 
victim’s social estimation, which, Hampton suggests, is translatable to a moral harm: 
“a person is morally injured when she is the target of behavior whose meaning, 
appropriately understood by members of the cultural community in which the 
behavior occurs, represents her value as less than the value she should be 
accorded.”108 Punishment, Hampton argues, reinstates equality by expressively 
denying “what the wrongdoer’s events have attempted to establish, thereby lowering 
                                                   
102  Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 126 (2008); Kahan, supra note 3, at 599; von Hirsch, supra note 
57, at 56. 
103 See, e.g., Skillen, supra note 21, at 520. 
104 See, e.g., Pablo de Greiff, Deliberative Democracy and Punishment 5 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 373, 390 (2002); Hill, supra note 56, at 418–22. 
105 See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE 
L. REV. 713, 715 (2008) (“[W]e punish harm not only in order to express something to the 
offender and about the offender, but also to express something to the victim and about the 
victim to others.”). 
106 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms]. 
107 See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 3, at 217; John Kleinig, Punishment and Moral 
Seriousness, 25 ISR. L. REV. 401, 418 (1991).  
108 Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 106, at 1670. 
256 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
the wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and annulling the act of diminishment.”109 In 
reinstating the value of equality, punishment is justified as an expressive cure to the 
victim’s diminished moral stature in the eyes of others.110 
The evil of crime in this view is not the immediate harm it causes to the victim 
or the community, but the denial of equality that is conveyed by the act; it is this evil 
that punishment aims to annul.111 “A criminal act,” George Fletcher likewise argues, 
“establishes a particular relationship” between the wrongdoer and the victim, in 
which the offender “gains a form of dominance that continues after the crime has 
supposedly occurred.”112 Punishment, on Fletcher’s view, is meant “to overcome 
this dominance and reestablish the equality of victim and offender.”113 Likewise, 
John Kleinig contends that punishment “negates or cancels the claim implicit in 
wrongdoing, that the interests of others are not all that important, that the wrongdoer 
is superior to others — or at least may determine how others are to be treated.”114 
There is, however, a critical flaw in this line of argument. If, as the proponents 
of this brand of expressivism insist, the value of equality is objectively valid, then 
how is it possible that the wrongdoer so effectively damages that value?115 If, in 
contrast, the wrongdoer’s actions do not “harm” the value of equality but only falsely 
contradicts it, why go through all the trouble of condemning it instead of simply 
refuting the wrongdoer’s error?116 As Christopher Ciocchetti reminds us, “[f]alse 
moral messages just are not the kind of thing that the criminal law punishes”; “true 
moral messages, while potentially useful, are, by themselves, not sufficiently 
morally important to justify punishment.”117 If punishment merely expresses the 
undeniable rationality of equality, why should it not be responded to, as Anthony 
Duff asks, with “a public and formal declaration, or the imposition of a purely 
symbolic punishment,” to “make it clear to everyone that we do deny the demeaning 
message implicit in the crime?”118 
                                                   
109 Id. at 1686–87 (“Punishment affirms as a fact that the victim has been wronged, and 
as a fact that he is owed a certain kind of treatment from others. Hence, on this view, it is 
natural for the victim to demand punishment because it is a way for the community to restore 
his moral status after it has been damaged by his assailant.”). 
110 See Hampton, supra note 3, at 217; see also BENNETT, supra note 102, at 191; 
Ciocchetti, supra note 40, at 66; Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 37–38; 
Meyer, supra note 6, at 119. 
111 Hampton, supra note 3, at 217. 
112 George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 51, 57 (1999). 
113 Id. 
114 Kleinig, supra note 107, at 418. 
115 This weakness is already implicit in its Kantian roots. See Duff, Penal 
Communications, supra note 29, at 36–37. 
116 See, e.g., Peter Königs, The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and 
the Emotions, 16 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 1029, 1044 (2013). 
117 Ciocchetti, supra note 40, at 70; see also GOLASH, supra note 2, at 52–60; Brian 
Slattery, The Myth of Retributive Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 27, 33 (Wesley 
Cragg ed., 1992); Dolinko, supra note 36, at 551. 
118 Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 40. 
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C.  Reconnecting with Values 
 
A third strand of expressivism seeks to justify the promotion of values with an 
argument that at the same time (unnecessarily) responds to the hard treatment 
problem by adopting what I have referred to above as a special approach to 
justification.119 The unique wrongness of crime, on this view, comes from the 
distance it creates between the wrongdoer and society’s values, and it is the purpose 
of punishment to eliminate this distance.120 In response to the wrongdoer’s painful 
loss of “allegiance to the values of society,” punishment, qua hard treatment, is 
justified as a form of moral education meant to better the moral composition of the 
wrongdoer by reconnecting her to society’s values.121 In this fashion, Robert Nozick, 
one of the first to justify punishment along these lines, suggests that the purpose of 
punishment is to “(a) connect the wrongdoer to value qua value (b) so that value qua 
value has a significant effect in his life, as significant as his own flouting of correct 
values.”122 To explain the “significant effect” of punishment, Nozick argues that 
“when [the wrongdoer] undergoes punishment these correct values are not totally 
without effect in his life (even though he does not follow them), because we hit him 
over the head with them.”123 Certainly, punishment hits the wrongdoer over the head, 
physically or figuratively, but why is doing so a meaningful and effective way of 
“connecting” her to “correct values?”  
I suggest that the answer to this question is to be found in the Hegelian 
inspiration of this strand of expressivism.124 Hegel is often mentioned in penal 
scholarship with reference to his peculiar yet influential suggestions that punishment 
                                                   
119 See Jean Hampton, Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case Study in 
the Expressive Meaning of the Law, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23, 40 (1998) (This is evident, for 
instance, in Hampton’s adoption of the view that in addition to its general purpose, 
punishment also serves the special purpose of curing the wrongdoer’s soul through the 
infliction of hard treatment); see also DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 
233–36; Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 33–35 (arguing that unless 
punishment is a necessary means of achieving the moral end it serves it cannot be justifiable). 
120 See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 3, at 40.  
121 See id. at 40; see also, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 97, at 1508 
(distinguishing between expression and communication); Dolinko, supra note 36, at 549 
(distinguishing between the two arguments Hampton makes); Duff, Penal Communications, 
supra note 29, at 32–33 (distinguishing between one-sided expression and reciprocal 
communication); Garvey, supra note 90, at 739 (distinguishing shaming punishment from 
punishment as moral education). 
122 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 375 (1981).  
123 Id. at 375; see also Slattery, supra note 117, at 33; von Hirsch, supra note 57, at 59. 
124 For a recent exploration of this connection, see Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: 
The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (2016). For similar 
discussions, see, for example, Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND 
MERCY 111, 115, 131, 142 (Jules Coleman ed., 1988) [hereinafter Hampton, The Retributive 
Idea]; see also Stephen P. Garvey, A Hegelian Criminal Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 147, 157–
58 (2011); Hampton, supra note 3, at 208; Meyer, supra note 5, at 119; Skillen, supra note 
20, at 511. 
258 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
“annuls” crime and that the wrongdoer “wills” her punishment.125 These ideas, 
however, are only specific aspects of Hegel’s overarching theme of actualization, by 
which he means the progress of the individual from insular and abstract 
consciousness to objectively true knowledge, achieved through her convergence 
with Geist—the unified mindfulness of the world.126 In the Hegelian worldview, the 
individual can only exist by itself in the abstract, alienated from herself and the 
world.127 By reconnecting with the community—which for Hegel manifests the 
Geist in its progress through history—the wrongdoer is uplifted from her wretched 
insular existence and brought closer to a meaningful existence.128  
Authors such as Duff, Hampton, and Nozick speak of the beneficial moral 
effect punishment arguably produces by connecting the wrongdoer to the communal 
values she abandoned; this idea makes non-metaphorical sense only if read in light 
of the political community’s role in Hegelian teleology as a necessary conduit 
between the individual and objective truth.129 Punishment, as the forced realignment 
between the wrongdoer and society’s values, is justified in this Hegelian fashion as 
a unique remedy to the wrongdoer’s metaphysical ailment:  
 
A person can find well-being only within a community which is, 
necessarily, structured by certain shared values and concerns, and within 
the kinds of relationships which such a community makes possible. A 
criminal who flouts the just laws of her community thereby injures herself: 
she separates herself from the values on which the community and her own 
well-being depend [. . .]She may not in fact be made consciously unhappy 
by her crime [. . .][b]ut this shows only that she, and those with whom she 
lives, have turned away from the values which should concern them; that 
they fail or refuse to see how such criminal pursuits are inconsistent with 
the existence of a community within which any worthwhile human life is 
possible; and that their relationships are themselves corrupted by false 
values. If she would only recognize the moral truth about her criminal 
                                                   
125 See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise 
in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 117–19 (1998); Ekow N. Yankah, 
Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral 
Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1060–62 (2004). 
126 A relatively concise pronunciations of Hegel’s teleological dialectics can be found 
in G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 11, 51 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977); see also 
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 47 (Alan Montefiore et al. eds., 1979).  
127 See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 126, at 21; Tronn Overend, Alienation: A Conceptual 
Analysis, 35 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 301, 306–07 (1975); Gavin Rae, Hegel, 
Alienation, and the Phenomenological Development of Consciousness, 20 INT’L J. PHIL. 
STUD. 23, 25 (2012). 
128 For explicitly Hegelian theories of punishment see, for example, Alan Brudner, In 
Defence of Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 93, 93–94 (Wesley Cragg ed., 
1990); Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel’s Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1581–83 (1994).  
129 See Kleinfeld, supra note 124, at 1543. 
2020] CONVENTIONS AND CONVICTIONS 259 
attitudes and activities, she would see how they are injurious to her true 
well-being.130 
 
If we are to understand these words as something other than mere platitudes, 
we must acknowledge their embeddedness in the Hegelian conception of the 
individual.131 Although Hegel accepts the fundamental Kantian ideal of equality,132 
his teleological philosophy insists that the individual’s existence becomes more 
meaningful, more actual, in her encounter with others, en route to the final 
convergence with Geist.133 This encounter, Hegel tells us, is initially perceived as 
the violent threat of self-destruction, amounting to what he describes as the life and 
death struggle for recognition, only to result, as his master/slave dialectic tells us, in 
a mutually-dependent recognition that brings with it the ascent to a greater level of 
self-consciousness.134 From this moment on, individuals—now parts of society—
constantly further their self-actualization against the forceful imposition of the 
community’s values, moving from the inner realm of essence to the external realm 
of concrete existence.135 
Animated by this teleological understanding of values, the special expressive 
approach argues that by committing a crime and alienating herself from the 
community’s values, the wrongdoer wrongs herself by making her moral existence 
less meaningful, as the recognition she receives from others diminishes.136 When 
                                                   
130 DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 256–57; see also Duff, Penal 
Communications, supra note 29, at 48; R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal 
Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 371–80 (1993) [hereinafter Duff, Choice, Character, and 
Criminal Liability]. 
131 See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 48–55 
(2003) [hereinafter DUFF, PUNISHMENT] (admitting his communitarian/Hegelian conception 
of the self); Henrique Carvalho, Terrorism, Punishment, and Recognition, 15 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 345, 353–63 (2012) (connecting the relations implicit in expressive theories with 
Hegel’s notion of recognition). 
132 See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 128, at 16–17; see generally Jay Drydyk, Hegel’s 
Politics: Liberal or Democratic?, 16 CAN. J. PHIL. 99 (1986) (discussing Hegelianism in the 
French Revolution and the tensions with the Kantian idea of equality). 
133 See HEGEL, supra note 126, at 290–91; see also ALAN PATTEN, HEGEL’S IDEA OF 
FREEDOM 130–33 (1999) (discussing the idea of community as necessary for a more 
meaningful existence). 
134 See HEGEL, supra note 126, at 116–19; see also PATTEN, supra note 133, at 130–33; 
ROBERT STERN, ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOK TO HEGEL AND THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 78, 113–14 (2002). 
135 See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 241 (Allen W. Wood 
ed., 2011) [hereinafter, HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]; G.W.F. HEGEL, 
HEGEL’S LOGIC 247–48 (William Wallace trans., 2009); see also STEPHEN HOULGATE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL: FREEDOM, TRUTH, AND HISTORY 78–82 (2nd ed. 2005); TAYLOR, 
supra note 126, at 1–14. 
136 See, e.g., Falls, supra note 57, at 40–41 (discussing this idea as a form of “earned” 
moral respect); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 
265 (1981) (“[T]he price paid for unconcern is some rupture in relationships, a separation 
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this approach speaks of the evil suffered by the wrongdoer for her crimes, it refers 
not to some psychological or metaphorical aches but to the “pain” of losing meaning, 
which affects the wrongdoer whether she is conscious of it or not:  
 
the immoral person thinks he is getting away with something, he thinks 
his immoral behavior costs him nothing. But that is not true; he pays the 
cost of having a less valuable existence. He pays that penalty, though he 
doesn’t feel it or care about it. Not all penalties are felt.137  
 
Punishment, so the special expressive theory argues, repairs this evil by 
reconnecting the wrongdoer to the community, restoring her diminished moral status 
by once again violently imposing the community’s values on her.138 
But exactly how does punishment eradicate the alienation of crime? Duff 
speaks of the three R’s punishment aims to accomplish: repentance, reform, and 
reconciliation.139 The question remains, however, as to what benefit there is in 
coerced repentance. Of even more consequence is the question of how imposing 
punishment for these purposes can be justified as a way of making the wrongdoer’s 
existence more meaningful.140 All too often the answers to these questions border on 
metaphor: the wrongdoer, we are told, is “hit over the head” with the community’s 
                                                   
from others, a feeling ill at ease with oneself, and some inevitable loss of emotional 
sustenance and sense of identity . . . .”); Tasioulas, supra note 32, at 294 (“[B]laming involves 
a withdrawal of full recognition from the wrong-doer, because their flouting of moral 
demands diminishes their status as a member of the relevant moral community.”). 
137 NOZICK, supra note 122, at 409; see also Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 
29, at, at 48–49. 
138 See, e.g., MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 247–51 (arguing that punishment can 
“deepen the agent’s understanding of morality and lead to her becoming a fully morally 
autonomous being.”); NOZICK, supra note 122, at 379 (“Wrong puts things out of joint in 
that acts and persons are unlinked with correct values; this is the disharmony introduced by 
wrongdoing. Punishment does not wipe out the wrong, the past is not changed, but the 
disconnection with value is repaired (though in a second best way); nonlinkage is 
eradicated.”); Dubber, supra note 128, at 1583 (“[T]he dialectic naturally moves from crime 
to punishment as punishment follows crime in the process of Reason’s self-actualization.”); 
Meyer, supra note 6, at 119 (“If separation is the result of wrong, then punishment is perhaps 
best understood as a practice repairing that separation, as Morris, Garvey, and Hegel 
understand it.”). 
139 See Duff, Penal Communications, supra note 29, at 47–51. 
140 See, e.g., DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 243–44 (admitting that 
that there is no real way of translating the hard treatment of punishment to the moral language 
and the desired moral outcome it purports to produce); MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 89–
91 (discussing the difficulty of forcefully educating the wrongdoer); Garvey, supra note 90, 
at 769–770 (arguing that moral education by punishment can be unnecessary or futile); 
Hampton, supra note 3, at 233–34 (admitting the difficulty of appealing to moral education 
to justify punishment). 
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values, “woken up” by punishment, and the like.141 Detached from their Hegelian 
roots, such explanations cannot but be seen as a denial of the need to justify 
punishment.142 Hegelian dialectics, however, purport to give these words non-
metaphorical meaning by suggesting that the healing power of punishment 
represents the kind of superior access to true knowledge that the community 
provides, imprinted on the individual in the form of external force.143 
Admittedly, the proponents of the special expressive justification seldom make 
the appeal to Hegelian dialectics explicit.144 Yet these extravagant metaphysical 
presumptions undermine this strand of expressivism none the less. In insisting that 
punishment can only be justified as an exhaustive and inimitable response to crime, 
this view casts the moral education of the wrongdoer—her realignment with the 
community’s values—as the sole way in which she can overcome the pains of 
alienation.145 In insisting on the necessary connection between punishment and 
crime, the proponents of this approach essentially suggest that there is some inherent 
therapeutic truth to communal values, unavailable to the individual who distances 
herself from them. This truth, they argue, does not represent any universal moral 
laws or consequential benefits but, rather, is the manifestation of the inherent 
metaphysical importance of communal life.146  
                                                   
141 See Garvey, supra note 90, at 763 (“[T]he state punishes the offender in order to 
‘wake him up,’ to get him to recognize and understand why what he has done was wrong, 
and ideally, to repent.”); Slattery, supra note 117, at 33 (criticizing the metaphorical and 
mystical terms in which hard treatment is described); von Hirsch, supra note 57, at 59 
(criticizing Nozick’s lack of clarity). 
142 As Marcus Dubber notes, doing so essentially requires connection with Hegel’s 
more problematic fundamental assumptions: “Demetaphysicizing Hegel without de-
Hegeling him is tricky business. Merely to envision his political philosophy, or for that 
matter any other aspect of his philosophical system, without his metaphysics requires 
considerable effort, as Hegel equated philosophy with metaphysics.” Dubber, supra note 
128, at 1585. 
143 See PATTEN, supra note 133, at 135. 
144 Some explicit appeals to Hegel include Hampton, The Retributive Idea, supra note 
124, at 131, 142; Hampton, supra note 3, at 208. 
145 See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 90, at 766.  
146 See, e.g., DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 131, at 51 (focusing “not on the question 
of how ‘I’ should live or what associations ‘I’ should form, but of how ‘we’ should live.”); 
MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 191 (“Rather than understand one’s ends as those of a 
separate, asocial being, and as better secured through co-operation, one must understand 
one’s ends as the ends of a co-operative being. One's flourishing is thus not merely 
contingently aligned with the flourishing of the whole, but necessarily connected to it.”); 
R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, in PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 57–58 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (arguing that autonomy could only be understood 
“as autonomy within a shared form of life, which alone can give the notion any substantive 
sense”); Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, supra note 130, at 382–83 (“Our 
life together, as a community, requires us to develop and sustain appropriate attitudes 
towards and concerns for each other – appropriate dispositions of thought, feeling and 
motivation. The criminal law, which embodies the values central and essential to that 
communal life, should thus be concerned with failures or defects in such dispositions, and 
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In turning to Hegelian theory as a way of addressing both the problem of hard 
treatment and of using punishment to express values, expressivism of the special 
sort inevitably inherits Hegel’s elevation of one’s communal belonging, attributing 
to the community the exclusive ability to propel the individual towards a more 
meaningful existence, even against her (wretched) will.147 This, as Duff admits, 
represents a substantial departure from those liberal theories that emphasize the 
separate and distinct identity of each individual, allocating her “an extensive private 
sphere which includes her moral beliefs and attitudes.”148 Still, as Charles Taylor 
notes, what is most troubling about this worldview is not so much the extravagant 
metaphysical assumptions it makes but the unadulterated optimism and certainty 
with which it makes them, putting immense, almost unlimited, trust in politics and 
its presumed progressivism.149 To hold such views is to have faith that despite its 
occasional errors, the community’s interaction with the individual and the 
imposition of its values is fundamentally beneficial. Surely, this view asks too much 
of us. To suggest that the runaway slave is somehow being bettered by her penal 
reunification with the communal value of slavery seems to give too much credit to 
the inherent truthfulness of communal values, despite Hegel’s best dialectical 
attempts to claim otherwise.150 
                                                   
with the criticism and correction of such failures or defects.”); Meyer, supra note 6, at 120 
(arguing that for this approach, “[a]nything that denies the fact (not the statement) of 
togetherness with others is crime. The relationship at stake is not the communication between 
victim and offender or even offender and society. The relationship is just the fact of 
togetherness in the world as creatures who reason.”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, 
Moral Education and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 8–9 (1985) (noting that the 
moral education approach is more at home in a Hegelian, non-liberal theory).  
147 See HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 135, at 46–49; 
HEGEL, supra note 126, at 262–71; see also KARL AMERIKS, KANT AND THE FATE OF 
AUTONOMY: PROBLEMS IN THE APPROPRIATION OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 313–17 
(Robert B. Pippin et al. eds., 2000); NOZICK, supra note 122, at 410; Sean Sayers, The Actual 
and the Rational, in HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 143, 147 (David Lamb ed., 1987); 
Andrew Arato, A Reconstruction of Hegel’s Theory of Civil Society, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1363, 1372 (1989). 
148 DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 131, at 56. 
149 As Charles Taylor puts it, what separates us from Hegel’s writing is “the sense men 
had that the horrors and nightmares of history, the furies of destruction and cruelty which 
remain enigmatic to agent and victim, were behind us. This sense, which Hegel expressed in 
his philosophy . . . is just about unrecoverable even by the most optimistic of our 
contemporaries.” TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 135. 
150 For Hegel’s Master/slave dialectic, see HEGEL, supra note 126, at 118–19. However, 
see DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 131, at 60, questioning the practical desirability of this 
theory given the grave risks of distortion, oppression and manipulation it gives rise to. On 
this risk Garvey states: 
 
The moral education theory of punishment asks a great deal. Of those who impose 
punishment, it asks that they do so in the spirit of a parent punishing a child. Of 
those who receive punishment, it asks that they respond to it and accept it as a 
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III.  FROM VALUES TO VALUATION 
 
In the remainder of this Article, I want to offer a different answer to the question 
of why punishment ought to be used to support social values. Doing so, I will 
suggest, involves viewing the promotion of values as an indirect way of supporting 
the individual interest in asserting her agency through valuation, meaning the 
process of assigning value to objects and communicating this value to others.151 
Values, in this sense, are not inherently valuable, but only conventional devices used 
for individual self-affirmation, media through which individuals communicate their 
reciprocal recognition of the other’s creative agency.152  
 
A.  The Threat of Meaninglessness 
 
The Hegelian treatment of values, discussed above, takes its cue from the 
modern threat of meaninglessness.153 Rene Descartes, who famously asserted that 
the only thing we can be certain of is our thinking self, our cogito, attributed such 
certainty to divine benevolence.154 David Hume’s more secular philosophy later 
denied this religion-based self-validation, leaving human thought struggling with the 
effort to find any sound meaning or truth in our existence.155 Max Weber later came 
to describe this loss of meaning as the “disenchantment of the world,” which he 
believed to be a result of modern science.156  
                                                   
way of making amends. All of which may be asking too much of citizens of the 
modern state.  
 
Garvey, supra note 90, at 774. See also Dolovich, supra note 40, at 313 (noting the risk to 
politically disenfranchised minorities); Steele, supra note 90, at 67; Jeremy Waldron, 
Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 132 (1987) (“If a person’s true self 
is thought to be partly or wholly constituted by the social order, then that self cannot ask the 
critical question ‘Is this the sort of order I accept? Is it one that I would have chosen?’”). 
151 “Valuing,” Samuel Scheffler writes, “comprises a complex syndrome of interrelated 
attitudes and dispositions, which includes but is not limited to a belief that the valued item is 
valuable,” adding that it is, therefore, “an attitudinal phenomenon that has doxastic, 
deliberative, motivational, and emotional dimensions.” SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, DEATH AND 
THE AFTERLIFE 16–17 (Niko Kolodny ed., 2013). 
152 See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, WHY WORRY ABOUT FUTURE GENERATIONS? 75–86 
(2018) (offering an account of “evaluative reciprocity”); Daniel Maggen, A Critique of 
Toleration (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
153 See HEGEL, supra note 126, at 51–52. See generally id. at 104–262 (discussing 
Hegelian treatment of values). 
154 See RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY: WITH SELECTIONS 
FROM THE OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES  73 (John Cottingham ed. & trans., 2013). 
155 Hume was primarily responding to John Locke’s view of ideas as non-empirical 
knowledge. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 24 (David Fate Norton & 
Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 2011). 
156 See HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 13–16 
(discussing the modern rejection of inherent knowledge, including knowledge of the self); 
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The profound anxiety brought about by the loss of the ability to anchor 
meaning, including the belief in our existence as distinct beings, has later developed 
into a central theme of existential philosophy and literature, but it does not confine 
itself to this domain.157 “[T]he most terrifying feature of human life,” as Ronald 
Dworkin writes, is “that we have lives to lead, and death to face, with no evident 
reason to think that our living, still less how we live, makes any genuine difference 
at all.”158 Hegel, who took this challenge head-on, believed that the only way to 
resolutely overcome the challenge of meaninglessness and the feeling of 
“homelessness” in the world it produces is found in the connection to the 
community, as a gateway to actual knowledge.159 For others, particularly in the 
existentialist tradition that responded to Hegel, the answer lies not in the certainty 
offered by the community but in the individual’s decision to view herself as an agent, 
even if this decision can only amount to an attestation of belief in her personhood.160 
Taking the Hegelian path leads, as discussed above in Section II.C., to a conception 
of punishment tilted towards the community and to a view of communal values as 
                                                   
Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 524, 544 (David Owen & 
Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004). 
157 See, e.g., ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., 1988); VIKTOR E. 
FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGOTHERAPY (Ilse Lasch 
trans., 1962); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson 
trans., 1962); SØREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (Alastair Hannay trans., 1985); 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: THE PRINCIPLE TEXT OF MODERN 
EXISTENTIALISM (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).  
158 Ronald Dworkin, The Concept of Unenumerated Rights—Unenumerated Rights: 
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 414 (1992). 
159 See STERN, supra note 134, at 8–11; J. Glenn Gray, Homelessness and Anxiety: 
Sources of the Modern Mode of Being, 48 VA. Q. REV. 24 (1972) (discussing the feeling of 
homelessness and the phenomenon of anxiety). 
160 One of the first to shift the focus to this decision to view oneself as an agent was 
Edmund Husserl, focusing on the individual’s attitude towards the question of his existence 
as a free and temporarily enduring being, “continuously constituting himself as existing . . . 
not only as flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live 
through this and that cogito, as the same I.” EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS 
66 (Dorion Cairns trans., 1964) (emphasis in original); see also HEIDEGGER, supra note 157, 
at 32 (“Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is 
ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in 
that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its 
Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being.”); 
PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 21 (Kathleen Blamey trans., 1995) (suggesting that 
“attestation defines the sort of certainty that hermeneutics may claim, not only with respect 
to the epistemic exaltation of the cogito in Descartes, but also with respect to its humiliation 
in Nietzsche and his successors”); SARTRE, supra note 157, at 595 (“[O]ur being is precisely 
[this] original choice, the consciousness (of) the choice is identical with the self-
consciousness which we have. One must be conscious in order to choose, and one must 
choose in order to be conscious.”); see generally JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM IS A 
HUMANISM 17 (Carol Macomber trans., 2007) (describing Sartre’s defense of existentialism 
against certain criticisms). 
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things of inherent value, essential for the assertion of one’s agency.161 In contrast, I 
will show below how adopting a more existentialist approach, geared towards the 
individual’s attitude towards her agency, can help produce a more liberal conception 
of values, centered not on the values themselves but rather on the individual’s 
process of valuation that endows them with meaning. 
 
B.  Valuing and Self-Assurance 
 
Even when an individual has taken to viewing herself as an agent, existential 
anxiety is enduring, rearing its ugly head whenever life treats her as if she were 
nothing but a lifeless object manipulated by forces beyond her control.162 Valuation, 
I suggest, can be understood as a mechanism individuals employ in order to 
overcome such doubts in order to persist in the affirmation of their agency.163 As 
Samuel Scheffler observes, caring for the values we subscribe to considerably assists 
us in treating ourselves as free continuous beings, providing “continuity amid the 
flux and contingency of daily life experience” as these values “help to stabilize our 
selves.”164 Although I do not intend to fully argue in favor of this view here, I will 
suggest that taking this viewpoint can provide the expressive account with the theory 
of value it requires.165  
The key to uncovering the link between values of this kind and the individual’s 
assertion of her personhood can be found, I suggest, in Kant’s often-overlooked 
writing on the nature of judgment, and of aesthetic judgment in particular.166 As is 
                                                   
161 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
162 Hannah Arendt most famously described the most extreme way in which personhood 
might thus be eradicated as the ultimate purpose of totalitarian regimes: 
 
The concentration camps not only eradicate people; they also further the 
monstrous experiment, under scientifically exacting conditions, of destroying 
spontaneity as an element of human behavior and of transforming people into 
something that is even less than animal, namely, a bundle of reactions that, given 
the same set of conditions, will always react in the same way. 
 
Hannah Arendt, Mankind and Terror, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 297, 304 (1994). But 
this destruction of selfhood appears also in less extreme cases. As Heidegger suggests, 
“‘[R]eal’ anxiety is rare. Anxiety is often conditioned by ‘physiological’ factors . . . Only 
because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety 
to be elicited physiologically.” HEIDEGGER, supra note 157, at 234. 
163 See Maggen, supra note 152. 
164 Samuel Scheffler, The Good of Toleration, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION: 
QUESTIONS OF VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 312, 325 (2010). 
165 This Article continues the work of Dan Kahan, which had explicitly left this 
theoretical foundation wanting. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 597. 
166 One of the few scholars to take serious the normative interest in this part of Kant’s 
writing was Hannah Arendt, who unfortunately passed away before she was able to complete 
her work on this subject. See HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 14 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1989). Arendt’s work is continued today by Jennifer 
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the case with much of his philosophy, Kant’s writing on judgment is interested in 
the meaning of the claims we are purporting to make when we make judgments: 
when we claim that water boils at 212℉ or that it is wrong to murder the innocent, 
Kant suggests that we are implicitly asserting the existence of laws of reason that 
ostensibly make our claims objectively valid.167 When it comes to aesthetic 
judgments, however, Kant notes that we are making a different kind of claims, 
purporting to be independently valid despite their lack of objective support.168 Thus, 
we may say that a piece of art is beautiful, but also that there is value in genetic 
connections, in serving turkey for Thanksgiving, or in a national border.169 Such 
aesthetic judgments, to which I will refer as valuative judgments, are different, Kant 
suggests, from mere judgments of taste, in that, in contrast with the latter, in making 
a valuative judgment the individual is making a claim that purports to be valid 
regardless of her own subjective preferences.170  
Valuative claims of this sort include judgments on “what we care about,” as 
Richard Greenstein puts it, encompassing “goals, interests, policies, principles, and 
so forth; moreover, what we care about can touch on economic, moral, political, 
aesthetic, religious, and other concerns.”171 The meaning of such judgments of value, 
Kant suggests, is found not in their object—meaning the values themselves—but 
rather in the kind of claim they stake: a demand that others recognize the individual’s 
                                                   
Nedelsky, whose work has some important points of convergence with the view suggested 
here. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS (2011).  
167 To put it differently, despite our inability to even come close to cognizing the “laws” 
that necessitate our scientific and moral convictions, such objective statements betray a 
lawful disposition towards the world, an expression of the belief that our experience of it is 
ultimately and unequivocally amenable to reason. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON 178–79 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds. & trans., 1999) (describing this 
disposition as the function of understanding); see also AMERIKS, supra note 147, at 69–70; 
see generally Karl Ameriks, Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality, 19 J. HIST. PHIL 53 
(1981). 
168 See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 91–95 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 
1987) (1790) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT] (describing the free lawfulness of 
the imagination); see also Jennifer Nedelsky, Judgment, Diversity, and Relational Autonomy, 
in JUDGMENT, IMAGINATION, AND POLITICS: THEMES FROM KANT AND ARENDT 103, 106–07 
(Ronald Beiner & Jennifer Nedelsky eds., 2001); Brad Seeman, What if the Elephant Speaks? 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment and an Übergang Problem in John Hick’s Philosophy of 
Religious Pluralism, 54 INT’L J. PHIL. RELIGION 157, 161 (2003). 
169 Kant primarily deals in this category with judgments of beauty and sublimity, but 
by this he broadly refers to judgments that stand in a symbolic relationship to objective value. 
See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 225–28.  
170 See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 57–60 (discussing judgment 
that is universally valid objectively and subjectively); see also Barbara Herman, Pluralism 
and the Community of Moral Judgment, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 60, 63–64 
(David Heyd ed., 1996). 
171 Richard K. Greenstein, Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2015). 
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ability to form them.172 Although our modern sensibilities force us to recognize that 
the validity of such judgments only can come from the individual’s valuative attitude 
towards them, we generally treat them as if they were somehow inherently 
important.173  
Although Kant does not explicitly detail why individuals form valuative 
judgments and acknowledge their validity, he recognizes that the ability to create 
judgments of value represents an unmatched form of agential freedom.174 It could, 
however, be speculated that the importance of valuative judgments lies precisely in 
their ability to validate one’s creative agency through others.175 In making a 
valuative claim and communicating it to another, one makes oneself vulnerable to 
the possibility of rebuff and ridicule, for the most rational response to such 
groundless claims is that of bewilderment.176 By nonetheless expecting others to 
acknowledge the validity of one’s values as judgments that go beyond mere personal 
preferences, the individual thus trusts the other to recognize her as a creative agent, 
capable of assigning meaning to otherwise meaningless objects.177 When such 
communicative valuation succeeds, it can assist the individual in asserting her 
agency against the threat of meaninglessness. 
Our values, in other words, are meaningful only to the extent that they are 
expressions of the ability to create and communicate meaning. Even though we often 
speak of values as things of inherent importance, what matters in this description is 
not whether we are correct in doing so, but rather our willingness to hold them as 
meaningful and to engage with others based on this attitude.178 The subject matter 
of which we speak when making a valuative judgment—the substance of our 
values—is but a placeholder for our assertion of creativity; the medium of valuation 
is itself the message, to borrow Marshall McLuhan’s phrasing.179 In asking others to 
join us in the communal and ongoing commitment to values, we ask and expect them 
                                                   
172 See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 89–95 (discussing judgment 
of taste as a subjective necessity that is presented as objective by presupposing a common 
sense). 
173 As Rudolf Makkreel notes, the thought that there might be something inherent to 
these valuations would go against the heart of Kant’s critical ideas. See RUDOLF A. 
MAKKREEL, IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT: THE HERMENEUTICAL IMPORT OF 
THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 50 (1990). 
174 These kind of claims, Kant notes, exceed even the claim to freedom made by moral 
judgments. See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 35; see also MAKKREEL, 
supra note 173, at 55.  
175 See HUSSERL, supra note 160, at 89–150 (discussing the role of inter-subjectivity). 
176 See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Valuing, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF 
VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 15, 23 (2010) (describing valuation as a form of 
emotional vulnerability); Niko Kolodny, Love as Valuing a Relationship, 112 PHIL. REV. 
135, 150–52 (2003) (likening love, as a form of vulnerability to valuation).   
177 See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 157–62 (discussing the idea 
that individuals experience sensations differently). 
178 See HUSSERL, supra note 160, at 92 (discussing the notion of cultural objects). 
179 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7–21 
(MIT Press 1994) (1964) (suggesting that “the medium is the message.”). 
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to mirror and affirm our belief in our enduring creativity, in our existence as persons 
rather than as mere atemporal agents.180 
 
C.  The Conditions of Successful Valuation 
 
If we accept the view of values as instruments for the support of agential self-
assurance, then their normative appeal, including their ability to justify punishment, 
becomes contingent on the ability of such values to support the function of self-
assurance through valuation. In assessing whether various values are indeed 
supportive of this purpose, we can make use of a set of conditions Kant referred to 
as the maxims of judgment.181 For Kant, these maxims require the individual to (i) 
think for herself,182 (ii) think from the standpoint of everyone else,183 and (iii) think 
consistently.184 For our discussion here, I will focus on the first two maxims, 
referring to them as the conditions of (1) creativity and (2) communicability, 
accordingly. 
 
1.  Creativity 
 
If an individual is to treat her valuations as signs of her creative agency, she 
must first and foremost be able to view her values as her own creations rather than 
something externally imposed on her.185 In contrast to the Kantian notion of moral 
autonomy, this does not entail, however, that she must see herself as the sole creator 
of her values.186 As other-relating claims, the formulation of values, even of one’s 
most personal and intimate ones, is an inherently collaborative process, based in 
social conventions and hermeneutics.187 Nevertheless, the influence of others on the 
formulation of one’s values must be limited to the language and terms in which the 
                                                   
180 As Samuel Scheffler puts it, “through the repetitive performance of acts that express 
our distinctive values and desires, we mark the world with continuities that are expressive of 
ourselves. In so doing, we confirm our sense of ourselves as persistent creatures, 
manufacturing, as it were, evidence to support our confidence in our persistence.” Samuel 
Scheffler, The Normativity of Tradition, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF 
VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY  287, 299 (2010) [hereinafter Scheffler, The 
Normativity of Tradition]. Richard Rorty makes a similar point, while emphasizing the 
fetishistic nature of such constructs. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF 
NATURE 344–45 (1980). 
181 See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 160–61.  
182 See id. at 161. 
183 See id. at 161–62. 
184 See id. at 162. 
185 See id. at 79 (discussing that a person’s taste is individually developed). 
186 See id. at 15–16, 44.  
187 See, e.g., ARENDT, supra note 166, at 14 (discussing the dependence of judgment on 
sociability); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
IDENTITY 31 (1989) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF] (describing the social 
frameworks of meaning that are essential for communication). 
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individual’s claim to valuation is voiced.188 As Charles Larmore puts it, “being fully 
ourselves does not require us to free ourselves from the imprint of social 
conventions—which is impossible, anyway—but only that we stop seeking our 
bearings from what we believe or imagine another might expect from us.”189 What 
this entails, in essence, is that values must be understood as purely conventional, 
subjective creations—fetishisms of a sort—intended to serve those who participate 
in their production rather than rule them.190 
 
2.  Communicability 
 
The second condition of judgment requires that the individual voicing the 
valuative judgment stakes her claim on the recognition of her creative agency rather 
than on some objectively valid considerations.191 Kant describes this condition in 
terms of the judgment’s communicability, or the ability of the individual to believe 
that another would accept her valuation as valid despite its subjectivity.192 
Essentially this condition entails that in seeking another’s recognition of her agency 
through communication, the individual is appealing to the other’s agency, and not 
to some objectively compelling considerations.193 
This means that in order to be communicable, judgments must first present 
themselves as impossibilities so that if they are indeed accepted, it is solely by virtue 
of another’s free recognition of the communicator’s creativity.194 If an individual 
argues that a particular value is inherently compelling, by claiming, for instance, that 
they are divinely or naturally mandated, then she does not, in fact, make her claim 
vulnerable to refutation as she does not expect the other to freely accept her claims. 
Likewise, if she makes the statement while waving a gun, acceptance of her claim 
would only be a sign of the objective validity of the material considerations to which 
her gesture is alluding. In either case, no true recognition could grow out of the 
other’s acceptance of the claim, for such acceptance would only be a sign of the 
other’s willingness to recognize the compelling appeal of the objective 
considerations the individual was invoking. 
 
                                                   
188 See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 79, 144, 161. 
189 CHARLES E. LARMORE, THE PRACTICES OF THE SELF xiii (Sharon Bowman trans., 
2010). 
190 See, e.g., ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT’S 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 46 (1989) (discussing the first maxim of judgment). Similar 
concerns are voiced by Seana Shiffrin. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Preserving the Valued 
or Preserving Valuing?, in DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE 143, 144–154 (2013). 
191 See KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, supra note 168, at 156. 
192 See id. at 144. 
193 See id. at 159. The reciprocity of recognition is later picked up by Hegel in his 
Master/slave dialectic. HEGEL, supra note 126, at 118–19. 
194 See, e.g., HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 11, at 164 
(discussing the leap of faith involved in communication); O’NEILL, supra note 190, at 42–
48 (discussing the second condition of judgment). 
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D.  The Anti-Valuative Harm of Wrongdoing 
 
If indeed, the importance of values is a function of the interest individuals 
possess in valuation, then the harm that criminal law has in mind when using 
punishment to condemn wrongdoing does not concern damage done to these values 
as such but rather to the ability of values to serve a valuative function.  
This suggests two kinds of harms that can be targeted by criminal law: first, an 
act of wrongdoing could harm its victim by denying her evaluative claims in a way 
that denies her ability to create values. By rejecting the victim’s power of valuative 
judgment, either by denying her access to values or by imposing on her external 
considerations that prevent her from acting on her values, the wrongdoer implicitly 
threatens to undermine the victim’s ability to believe in herself as a person.195 
Eroding the ability of the victim to assert herself through valuation, the wrongdoer 
stocks her fear of meaninglessness. As Hampton accurately notes, “[f]ear that we 
are worth less than we wish (or perhaps less than others think we are worth) is a 
common human phenomenon . . . . A value-denying act can, therefore, be frightening 
to the victim (and others like him), insofar as it plays into those fears.”196  
Second, the harm of wrongdoing can present itself in a more general and 
indirect way, by diminishing the effectiveness of social values, undermining the 
ability of individuals to rely on them in the course of making valuative claims. 
Stealing a pen from a department store would hardly affect its owner in a way that 
would diminish her ability to assert her agency, but it does undermine the efficacy 
of the value of private property on which both the owner and the rest of society rely 
in their valuative efforts.197 Even when a given “victim” does not perceive herself as 
being negatively affected by value-denying behavior, all of society is victimized by 
it, as all those who are exposed to its personhood-denying message are potentially 
discouraged by it.198 As Scheffler avers:  
 
Given that our normative and evaluative convictions serve these functions, 
it is not surprising that being prevented from acting in accordance with 
values one regards as authoritative, or being constrained to act in 
accordance with values that one rejects, should be perceived as a grave 
injury. By attacking the deliberative and motivational nexus via which our 
                                                   
195 See, e.g., O’NEILL, supra note 190, at 44, 133. 
196 Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 106, at 1678; see also, CHRISTINE M. 
KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 143 (1996). 
197 I am indebted to Daniel Markovits, Gideon Yaffe and Roman Zinigrad for provoking 
my thinking of this point, even if they might not agree with my resolution of it. 
198 See, e.g., MATRAVERS, supra note 28, at 76–77 (noting that the victim does not 
always feel diminished by the crime); Hanna, supra note 26, at 140 (noting that criminal 
behavior is wrong even when the wrongdoer does not intend to negatively affect the self-
worth of the victim); Adam J. MacLeod, All for One: A Review of Victim-Centric 
Justifications for Criminal Punishment, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 31, 60 (2008). 
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values are translated into actions, these forms of interference and 
constraint amount to a kind of assault on the self.199 
 
IV.  VALUATION AND CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The valuative framework suggested above, and its corresponding conception of 
wrongdoing, can help us better understand the expressivist claim that punishment is 
justified as a conventional device for the promotion of social values.200  
From a valuative perspective, we can distinguish between three functions 
served by criminal law in support of valuation: (i) establishing a shared depository 
of values; (ii) instructing individuals, through criminalization, on the breadth of 
these values; and (iii) countering the adverse effects of wrongdoing through 
punishment.201 The justification of punishment primarily refers to the last function. 
On the valuative approach suggested here, when an individual acts in a way that 
impairs the ability of others to assert their personhood, the state is tasked with 
responding in a way that reaffirms the ability of others to assert their personhood. 
The main difference between this approach and the value-minded expressive 
justification is the realization that not all values are worthy of protection, but rather 
only those that support valuation, and only to the degree that they do so.  
 
A.  Pronouncing Communal Values 
 
For the valuative expressive account, law is concerned with, among other 
things, the proclamation of the community’s values, those objects which are 
collectively regarded as valuable.202 This does not imply that the state, as a collective 
of individuals, is capable of the kind of valuation discussed here; instead, the state 
acts as an aggregate of values, amassing the individual valuations that comprise it.203 
                                                   
199 SCHEFFLER, supra note 164, at 312, 315, 326. 
200 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 3, at 400; Kahan, supra note 3, at 596. 
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individual’s moral obligation to follow the law). 
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IN THE GLOBAL ERA ix (2002) (opposing the thought of cultures as discrete wholes); 
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 97, at 1514–20 (arguing for the possibility of collective 
agency).  
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The legal affirmation of values assures individuals that they can communicate their 
values not only amongst themselves but also on a larger scale, encompassing the 
entire community—or at least large parts of it. Law, in this sense, is a catalog of 
those objects toward which the state’s citizenry currently holds a valuative 
disposition. This catalog usually contains general values, such as those of bodily 
integrity, private property, and the family, in addition to values that are specific to 
the community and its institutions, including those of particular traditions, state 
symbols, and common conceptions of the good life.204  
By articulating the community’s catalog of values, law does more than just 
demonstrate the feasibility of successful communication. In making publicly known 
those values upon which members of the community institutionally agree, law can 
help minimize breakdowns in communication, and enable people to transcend 
valuative disagreements by placing them within a broader context of agreement on 
valuation.205 People can, for example, disagree on the particular ways in which 
private property is allocated or about the extent to which bodily integrity is 
protected, but the law can help them better realize that they ultimately share the same 
fundamental form of valuation despite their different interpretations of it. By 
creating a clear border between one individual’s possessions and another’s, or by 
protecting one’s body from external transgressions, law declares that private 
property and one’s body are objects to which individuals in the community 
commonly attach considerable value. While some people in the community may be 
radical libertarians and others socialists, law frames their disagreement so that they 
understand each other as agreeing on the fundamental assignment of value to 
property.  
As the conditions of judgment instruct, if law is to serve its valuative function, 
it must be understood as an example of creative valuation and communication, and 
not as a statement of fidelity to the inherent importance of the values themselves.206 
Consequently, the enactment of values cannot exclude parts of the community from 
participating in the ongoing creation of the enacted values.207 Exclusionary values, 
tainted by racism, sexism, or other forms of bigotry, cannot be coherently included 
in the catalog of values acknowledged by the state.208 Likewise, values that have 
entered the legal inventory in ways that do not reflect free valuation or have been 
admitted into it without the possibility of ouster cannot be considered legitimate 
parts of it.209  
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B.  Criminalization 
 
If law, in general, aids individuals by presenting them with commonly shared 
values, the valuative theory suggests that criminalization provides them with 
specific instruction on how various forms of behavior will either be taken to be in 
line with the value assigned to the specific object or as a sign of the actor’s denial of 
the value assigned to it. In this way, law advises individuals that promising others 
payment for their property is commonly viewed as respectful of their valuation of 
private property while threatening to otherwise destroy it denies it. 
Criminalization, in this sense, is a guidebook for proper valuative 
communication, for even one who genuinely intends to recognize the other’s 
valuative capacities might err in doing so without guidance on shared conventions. 
As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes suggest,  
 
[e]xpressive theories of action tell us to express certain attitudes 
adequately. The standard of adequacy is not met simply by intending to 
express those attitudes, or by thinking that one’s actions do express those 
attitudes. Rather, the standard of adequacy is public, set by objective 
criteria for determining the meanings of action.210  
 
Whether criminal law is aimed at the “bad man,” as Oliver Wendell Holmes 
maintained,211 or aimed at the “‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is willing to 
do what is required, if only he can be told what it is,” as H.L.A. Hart replied,212 
criminal law, according to the valuative account, specifies the ways in which 
reasonable people in a given society usually interpret external expressions as 
indications of the actor’s disposition toward valuation. Even without the threat of 
punishment, prohibition is a warning sign that certain actions will be perceived as 
denials of the possibility of valuation, potentially undermining the ability of others 
to assert their personhood.213 
Law not only directs people on how their interactions with others will be 
understood, but also on how and whether others will be negatively affected by the 
more general flouting of communal values.214 Law can, for instance, prohibit 
expressions of racism, pornography, or cruelty toward animals, even when they are 
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not part of direct interpersonal interaction with another individual;215 for the 
valuative account, this can be justified in light of the indirect harm of such actions.216  
In discussing this idea, Cass Sunstein notes the clearly expressive motivation 
behind the proposal to ban flag burning.217 Any such ban, Sunstein notes, is clearly 
not aimed at eliminating the threat of flag burning itself or its immediate effect but 
is meant to clarify that burning the national flag would be obnoxious to the majority 
of members in the community.218 Once we understand criminalization as interested 
in valuation and not in values as such, it becomes apparent that such grounds for 
prohibition risk conflating the two. In guiding individuals on how they ought to 
respect society’s values, criminal law cannot go as far as reifying these values 
themselves, for doing so would only defeat their valuative purpose. An act of flag 
burning can have various meanings. To burn a national flag in protest of that nation’s 
disrespect of individuals might be offensive to the members of that nation but it is, 
in fact, an affirmation of the importance of valuative personhood. To ban such 
protests is to overlook that the flag’s value derives only from the support it lends to 
the ability of all individuals to assert themselves.219 Burning the flag to protest the 
mistreatment of minorities is an affirmation of this conception of the flag, an 
expression of disappointment with the particular flag’s failure to fulfill its 
purpose.220 The meaning of the act would be different, for instance, with regard to 
burning a gay pride flag, when the act is meant not as a protest against mistreatment 
(say of certain members within the LGBTQ community) but as a protest against 
equality and inclusion. To ban the burning of a gay pride flag is to signal that people 
will generally see the act not as an internal argument within the confines of 
valuation, but as a denial of the ability of certain individuals to express their 
personhood.221  
                                                   
215 In some cases, this will involve serious questions of freedom of expression, as is the 
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Context is of utmost importance here, and the criminal law must tread lightly if 
it is to refrain from stifling communication rather than encouraging it.222 Conflict 
and disagreement are almost inherent to valuation, and certainly do not express, in 
themselves, its denial. As the conditions of judgment dictate, to make a valuative 
claim is to open oneself up to the possibility of rebuff, and ruling out all possibility 
of denial would only diminish the payoff of successful communication.223 Behavior 
that denies another’s valuative capacities might cause her great anxiety, but, as such, 
it is no different from the fundamental crisis of meaning that prompts her to assert 
her personhood to begin with.224 Rather than contradict itself by seeking to eliminate 
any form of existential anxiety, criminal prohibition must be limited to those 
instances in which one individual interferes with another’s attempt at valuative self-
assertion, thereby denying her this route of dealing with this anxiety.225 
 
C.  Punishment 
 
Criminal law, as we have seen, can aid individuals in asserting their personhood 
via valuative communication by presenting them with a shared vocabulary of values 
and by supplying them with guidelines that can help them interpret the actions of 
others and predict how their own actions are likely to be interpreted.226 Despite this 
support, there will always be those who choose to reject the conditions of judgment 
and act in ways that disrupt the ability of others to valuatively assert their 
personhood: by treating them as objects, denying their power of valuation, or by 
undermining the values they subscribe to.227 Being treated in such ways or observing 
such behavior toward others diminishes the ability of individuals to believe that there 
is truth to their belief in communicability, presenting them with what appears to be 
evidence that human beings are incapable of engaging one another in intersubjective 
valuation.228 By inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer, the state sends out a 
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resolute countermessage, intended to reassure the belief of all members of the 
community in the possibility of communicability.229 
Punishment, thus understood, operates by example and, as was discussed 
above, it must take care not to set the wrong one.230 According to the valuative 
argument, by penalizing the wrongdoer, the state signals the community’s continued 
commitment to the idea of communicability, assertively suppressing the damage 
done by the wrongful act. The purpose of such communication is not to convince its 
recipients of the truth of personhood or on the possibility of valuation—any attempt 
to do so would be futile, if not counterproductive—but only to offset the force with 
which the wrongdoer imposed her nihilism on the victim and society at large.231  
In order to refute the wrongdoer’s message and reaffirm the belief in values and 
valuation the message conveyed by punishment must be expressed according to the 
conventions that inform such expressions.232 As expressivists generally note, the 
conventions prevalent in most, if not all human societies entail that such expressions 
take the form of hard treatment.233 There is, however, nothing inherent in the 
conventional connection between crime and punishment qua hard treatment, and 
there are certainly no reasons to make use of hard treatment to express the message 
of punishment when there are more efficient ways of doing so.234   
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The valuative underpinning of punishment entails that when forcing the 
wrongdoer to be part of its expressive undertaking, the state must take care not to 
ignore the wrongdoer’s own claim to personhood in the process.235 This significantly 
limits the availability of various forms of punishment, even if they can effectively 
communicate condemnation.236 As Kahan advises, effective punishment requires a 
strong fit between the use of punitive means and the message punishment aims to 
convey.237 Identifying the condemnatory function of punishment can lead us in some 
cases, he argues, to prefer so-called “shaming” sanctions, such as widely publicizing 
the names of wrongdoers, demanding that they bear marks of their wrongdoing or 
participate self-debasing or apology rituals, over the traditional hard treatment of 
incarceration and fines.238 However, while shaming sanctions can indeed be more 
effective means of condemnation, their effectiveness must be weighed against their 
impact on the more general purpose of supporting individual self-assertion. As 
James Whitman responds to Kahan, shaming punishments risk undermining the 
purpose of punishment, not because the shaming means might be inappropriate, but 
because they risk expressing the wrong kind of disposition toward personhood.239 
“Speaking of shame sanctions as ‘condemnation,’” Whitman observes, “does not do 
justice to our intuitive sense of their peculiar kind of brutality and terror.”240 Indeed, 
shaming, in this context, may be an appropriate expression of condemnation, but it 
risks distorting the meaning of condemnation, so it becomes synonymous with 
retaliation and vengeance, connecting crime and punishment so closely that 
condemnation is no longer cognizant of the more fundamental purpose of assisting 
individuals in asserting their personhood.  
 
V.  SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ABORTION 
 
This Article has argued that substituting the language of values with the 
language of valuation not only makes better sense of the expressive theory of 
punishment but also illuminates some of the constraints on using punishment as a 
means of expressing condemnation.241 In the following pages, I will briefly explore 
some ways in which these limits can present themselves in the case of the possible 
criminalization and punishment of abortion. In doing so, I do not intend to make 
substantive arguments for or against the permissibility or appropriateness of 
abortion. A large part of the debate on abortion concerns the specific meanings 
assigned to the various values abortion invokes and the moral and scientific 
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determinations to be made regarding the status of the fetus.242 As the subject of this 
Article is the justification of punishment, this Article cannot take account of these 
considerations. I do, however, believe that acknowledging the valuative function of 
criminal law can help clarify the relationship between the potential criminalization 
and punishment of abortion and the social values that would ostensibly justify them. 
To illuminate the points in which the valuative paradigm is the most pertinent, 
I will confine the issue of abortion to the way in which it was framed by the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade.243 The Court’s opinion was informed by four 
factors: the moment during which the fetus becomes a person;244 the state’s interests 
in regulating abortion;245 the changes in the relative weight of these interests as the 
pregnancy progresses;246 and the woman’s right to privacy.247 These factors, we shall 
see, are aligned with the valuative framework proposed above, suggesting the extent 
to which these factors can be interpreted by those who would disagree with the way 
in which they played out in the Court’s opinion. 
 
A.  Abortion and Personhood 
 
According to the Roe v. Wade Court’s interpretation, the legal proscription of 
abortion can have in mind three potential “victims”: the fetus, the woman, and the 
state’s interests.248 Of these, the Court primarily dealt with the effects of abortion on 
the third.249 Given the nature of the proceeding before it—a case brought by a woman 
against the state’s prohibition of abortion250—it is hardly surprising that the Court 
largely avoided the possible victimization of women by abortion.251 But the Court 
was also reluctant to consider the fetus a potential victim of abortion—a stance 
shared by the following discussion. 
The Court reached this decision primarily by considering the moment at which 
the claim to personhood materializes as a matter of legal convention.252 Distancing 
itself from any pretense of making a scientific, moral, or philosophical statement of 
fact, the Court surveyed the ways in which the term “person” was used by common 
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law, concluding that it was not commonly understood to include the unborn.253 
Although I see no reason to diverge from this conclusion, I want to remark on how 
the question might be treated by the valuative theory. 
Under the valuative approach, respect for an agent’s personhood is mandated 
by her ability to mirror and validate another’s claim to personhood.254 To deserve 
such respect, an agent does not necessarily have to be capable of actual verbal 
communication; the question is whether others can envision her as capable of doing 
so.255 The validity of one’s valuative judgments is a matter of communicability, not 
of communication. To be able to believe that she is capable of assigning value and 
communicate it to others, the individual needs only to be able to believe that others 
would acknowledge her ability to do so, not that others actually do so. Accordingly, 
the respect individuals are due are as potential agents, which could be perceived by 
others as capable of communication. A potential partner for communication could, 
therefore, be unavailable—she could be far away, asleep, or unconscious—but she 
could also be incapable of actual communication, being an infant, mentally 
impaired, an unborn fetus, or even an animal.256 The question of who or what is 
potentially a person concerns the limits of valuative imagination and is a matter of 
social conventions.257  
Nevertheless, I believe that a persuasive case can be made in favor of viewing 
the moment after birth, in which we meet the eyes of another human being as the 
moment in which we begin to perceive them as potential partners in communication. 
As Sartre notes, it is in the imagined gaze of another that we are constantly made 
aware of the possibility of our own personhood.258 Although we can bear with us the 
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thought of another’s gaze even though we have never set eyes upon them nor they 
on us, there is, as Levinas noted, something remarkable about the encounter with 
another’s visage, “in the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the 
Other.”259 In this sense, the Court’s ruling that an unborn fetus is not a rights-baring 
person is a matter of legal convention, but it is not one that could be easily altered. 
A child minutes after birth barely has more capacity for agency than a fetus moments 
prior to it.260 By the same token, it takes quite some time after birth for a child to 
actually develop the qualities that are commonly associated with agency. What 
changes in birth is not some physical or metaphysical quality of the fetus but the 
tendency to view it as a potential partner in communication by virtue of its ability to 
mirror the claims to personhood of others. 
 
B.  The Values Protected by Abortion Prohibition 
 
When law prohibits certain behavior, it will not always be clear what values the 
prohibition serves. In such cases, it is up to the court deciding on the justifiability of 
the prohibition to discern which values inform the law and whether their enactment 
into law conforms with the valuative purpose of the prohibition.261 
The Roe v. Wade Court acknowledged three sets of values as potentially 
informing the prohibition of abortion: the value of “proper” sexual conduct; the 
safety of medical procedures; and potential life.262 The first of these values was 
promptly rejected by the Court, as the state did not purport to justify the prohibition 
by reference to it.263 The valuative theory suggests that this omission may have been 
too hasty. The question of whether the state’s proclaimed intention in enacting the 
prohibition necessarily determines its actual meaning exceeds the bounds of our 
discussion. Still, given the conventional nature of values, it is clear that the 
enactment of values into law cannot sever them from the broad cultural context that 
gives them concrete meaning.264 Accordingly, the values implicitly promoted by the 
prohibition of abortion—sexuality, womanhood, procreation, maternity, and the 
like—can have a profound impact on how the protection of the more explicit values 
is interpreted.265 Although the involvement of such implicit values does not 
necessarily disqualify any prohibition that is informed by them, they can still inform 
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the determination of whether the prohibition in question indeed supports the purpose 
of promoting individual valuation. Values that circumscribe the creativity of women 
to certain aspects of their physiology and that undermine their ability to be perceived 
as full-fledged political agents, capable of shaping communal values, can only be 
regarded as values in a very narrow sense, incongruent with the purpose of 
valuation.266 To the extent that such “values” inform the prohibition of abortion, the 
prohibition necessarily lacks justification. 
Similar considerations apply to the value of bodily integrity as it informs the 
regulation of medical procedures. Although there is no doubt that the integrity of 
one’s body is a legitimate value, this value must be expressed in a way that does not 
reflect differently with respect to men and women; specifically, such protection 
cannot single out the reproductive capacities of women as a sole, or superior cause 
for concern.267 Certainly, there are good reasons for the state to seek to prohibit 
needlessly dangerous medical procedures, meaning procedures that can be made less 
hazardous.268 The Court, however, went on to allow the prohibition of excessively 
dangerous abortions, meaning those procedures in which the predicted risk to the 
women’s bodily integrity from the abortion is higher than the risk posed by the 
continuation of the pregnancy.269 While there is nothing inherently biased about this 
degree of care for the bodily integrity of patients, no such excessive caution is taken 
with regard to many other medical procedures that are riskier than the condition they 
seek to eliminate, from elective surgeries to various procedures meant to promote 
fertility and conception, at times involving risk to those who undergo them.270 Such 
forms of partiality raise doubt as to whether the connection between the prohibition 
of abortion and the general concern with physical well-being is sincere, raising the 
                                                   
266 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 
60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 160, 163 (2012) (“[A]bortion restrictions deprive women of 
control over the timing of motherhood and so predictably exacerbate the inequalities in 
educational, economic, and political life engendered by childbearing and childrearing.”). 
267 Although much of the debate today concerns regulation of the medical procedure of 
abortion, this discourse must be understood within the general struggle of the antiabortion 
movement to ban abortion altogether. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of 
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706–12 
(2008). 
268 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Compelling Governmental Interest Jurisprudence of 
the Burger Court: A New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50 ALB. L. REV. 675, 699 (1986); 
Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest in 
Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 875–876 (2016). 
269 This is implicit in the Court’s calculating of the risks involved in abortion against 
the risks involved with birth to the conclusion that prohibition of abortion is justifiable when 
the former outweighs the latter. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149–50 (1973). 
270 See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller et al., Cosmetic Surgery and the Internal Morality of 
Medicine, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 353 (2000); Michelle Leve et al., Cosmetic 
Surgery and Neoliberalisms: Managing Risk and Responsibility, 22 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 
121 (2012); Jennita Reefhuis et al., Fertility Treatments and Craniosynostosis: California, 
Georgia, and Iowa, 1993–1997, 111 PEDIATRICS 1163 (2003). 
282 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
suspicion that the prohibition is informed by considerations that diminish rather than 
strengthen the valuative claim to personhood of those involved. 
The third and final value involved with the prohibition of abortion, the value of 
potential life, is the value with the most evident connection to the prohibition. It 
must, however, be kept in mind that in talking of the protection of potential life, we 
are discussing not the protection of the fetus qua rights-bearing (potential) person, 
but rather the protection of the social value assigned to biological objects that have 
the potential of transforming into persons.271 This does not suggest, however, that 
the value of biological life is meaningless for the valuations of people in the 
community, for as we saw, values are important as media of valuation.272  
“A community,” as Dworkin writes, “has an interest in protecting the sanctity 
of life—in protecting the community’s sense that human life in any form has 
enormous intrinsic value—by requiring its members to acknowledge that intrinsic 
value in their individual decisions.”273 Dworkin, however, errs in suggesting that 
there is “intrinsic” value to biological life.274 Instead, as Dworkin himself notes in 
the same sentence, the value assigned to biological life represents the “community’s 
sense” that a biological connection to the human race makes certain objects unique.  
Even though the value assigned to biological humanity could, theoretically, 
justify the prohibition of abortion, as Neil and Reva Siegel point out, there are good 
reasons to suspect that this value is, in fact, that which informs the prohibition.275 As 
Siegel and Siegel further note note, while many legislatures purport to anchor the 
prohibition of abortion in the value of biological humanity, if that was their true 
intent, it would be expected that legislatures “would bend over backwards to provide 
material support for the women who are required to bear—too often alone—the 
awesome physical, emotional, and financial costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and 
childrearing,” which they often fail to do.276 
 
C.  Prohibiting Abortion  
 
Despite the fact that the Texas statute at the center of the Roe v. Wade litigation 
was primarily aimed against the physician performing the procedure, the Court 
largely ignored the physician’s role and charted the limits of the prohibition in light 
of the relation between the woman’s right to privacy and the state’s interest in 
securing the values discussed above.277 For the Court, the weight assigned to the 
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protected social values increases as the pregnancy progresses.278 As a result, the 
Court ruled that protecting the value of safe medical procedures justifies the 
prohibition of abortion when abortion becomes riskier than carrying the pregnancy 
to term, and that the social value assigned to biological humanity justifies 
prohibition once the fetus reaches the stage of viability, when the state interest in 
protecting this value outweighs the woman’s right to privacy.  
The appeal to privacy as the right against which the state’s interests are 
measured struck the dissenting Justice Rehnquist as odd, and not without good 
reason: 
 
I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of 
“privacy” is involved in this case. Texas, by the statute here challenged, 
bars the performance of a medical abortion by a licensed physician on a 
plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation such as this 
is not “private” in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the “privacy” 
that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from 
searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to 
privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). If the Court means by 
the term “privacy” no more than that the claim of a person to be free from 
unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions may be a form of 
“liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no doubt that 
similar claims have been upheld in our earlier decisions on the basis of 
that liberty.279 
 
Against this objection, the valuative theory suggests that the language of 
privacy is an appeal to a substantive right but rather a proxy for the communicative 
aspects of the act in question, designed to determine whether the prohibition is 
logically aimed at the protection of values qua instruments of valuation. Prohibition, 
the valuative theory tells us, is meant to specify the forms of behavior that are likely 
to be interpreted by members of the community as a denial of their ability to form 
values.280 In this sense, to deem abortion private is to view it as a non-communicative 
behavior; meaning a form of behavior that is not commonly understood to take place 
between two or more individuals.281 What makes the act of abortion private is not 
its reproductive subject matter or its role in the decisions that shape one’s family 
life, but the fact that it is not understood to convey a message. 
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As the Court notes, the interpretation of the act of abortion may change as the 
pregnancy progresses;282 abortion might in this sense become a public matter if its 
denial of the protected value is so severe that it cannot but be seen by the community 
as a denial of valuation itself. An abortion performed one minute prior to birth could, 
by this token, become communicative, even though the fetus is not yet regarded as 
a person, for the proximity to the moment in which the claim to personhood 
materializes makes it a form of behavior that people throughout the community 
cannot disregard. Deciding on the exact moment in which the act of abortion enters 
the public domain is a matter of convention, evaluated in light of the principles 
governing valuation.283  
 
D.  Punishing Abortion 
 
The criminalization of abortion, the Court found, can be justifiable in view of 
the message it sends, expressing support for the values of biological humanity and 
medical safety.284 As the valuative theory suggests, the criminalization of actions 
that harm these values is justified because, through criminalization, the law both 
signals its support of valuation and instructs people on how to express similar 
support.285 These purposes, however, can be promoted independently of the response 
to wrongdoing.286 Although in most cases, the lack of a condemnatory response to 
criminal wrongdoing would be seen as diminishing or even excoriating the state’s 
expression of commitment towards the protected values, the valuative point of view 
suggests that there can certainly be cases in which the connection between the 
legislative declaration of support and the penal expression of condemnation is not 
as immediate. 
Abortion can be seen as one such case. Even though there may be good reasons 
to accept certain aspects of the prohibition of abortion, particularly those concerning 
its effect on the value of biological humanity during later stages of pregnancy, there 
may nonetheless be reason to believe that they do not necessitate supplanting 
criminalization itself with a condemnatory message. Valuation, as we have seen, is 
based in part on the possibility of disagreement; insisting on condemning those who 
commit controversial illegal acts risks becoming an attempt to reify values and 
eliminate the possibility of disputing them. Although this does not pave the way to 
disregarding the law, it makes law more appreciative of the possibility of dissent and 
less condemnatory in its reply to it.  
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This is particularly so, when, as is the case with abortion, condemnation would 
only exacerbate an already existing difficulty with the protected values.287 As Siegel 
suggests, even if we accept, for the sake of argument, the legitimacy of prohibiting 
abortion, we cannot disregard the troubling side effects it involves: 
 
(1) whatever the asserted fetal-protective rationale, in actual practice legal 
restrictions on abortion have reflected and entrenched customary, gender-
differentiated norms concerning sexual expression and parenting; (2) they 
have conscripted the lives of poor and vulnerable women without similarly 
constraining the privileged; (3) they have punished women for sexual 
activity without holding men commensurately responsible; and (4) they 
have used law to coerce, but not to support, women in childbearing.288 
 
Despite the importance of the values the prohibition of abortion is intended to 
express, the condemnation of the act of abortion cannot be considered apart from the 
profound—and at times life-changing—implications that performing, or not 
performing it carry with them.289 Even when we can attribute to this act, the 
wrongness associated with flouting the community’s values, we cannot disregard 
the fact that heeding these values involves an immense incursion into the lives of 
individuals, particularly of women, and that the prohibition is often unaccompanied 
by meaningful provisions that might offset the price it extracts.290 While these 
considerations might fall short of upending the justifiability of the prohibition, they 
carry much more weight when justifying the condemnatory response. Given the 
alternative ways in which the value of biological humanity might be affirmed, 
particularly those that would obviate the need for abortion, such as contraceptives 
and sexual education, a policy that ignores the latter while focusing on condemnation 
seems to betray the kind of dishonesty that can undermine the state’s expression of 




The valuative theory of punishment tells us that punishment is justified for its 
contribution to the general legal purpose of assisting individuals in their valuative 
self-assurance. The individual, the theory argues, is driven by an existential interest 
in believing that she is a person: enduring, creative, and distinct from the world. To 
promote this interest, the individual, among other things, seeks to endow 
inconsequential objects with meaning and communicate this meaning to others so 
that they can affirm her claim to personhood by acknowledging her valuative claim. 
Law, this Article argues, promotes this interest in three main ways: by creating an 
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inventory of agreed-upon values; by providing hermeneutic guidelines for the 
interpretation of the relation of various forms of behavior to these values; and by 
sending a counter-message to offset the effects of those forms of behavior that set 
back the interest in self-assurance.291 
As this Article illustrated, this theory does not contend that there is some 
inherent importance to the values it supports, nor that there is some necessary 
connection between crime and punishment. Punishment, this Article argues, is a 
response to crime, but there is nothing unique or obligatory about this response. The 
state contributes in various ways to the valuative interest, and punishment is one of 
them. That punishment serves to express condemnation of wrongdoing is essential 
to punishment’s understanding. However, condemnation itself is only a 
conventional response, which, like the other conventional components of criminal 
law, is merely an instrument in the service of the conviction that human beings are 
persons. 
The key to understanding this idea lies with its ironical stance, taking the 
conventions and convictions it deals with with a grain of salt without disparaging 
them.292 The irony of the valuative approach is the recognition that the meaning we 
assign to the things we hold dear—even to our own personhood—is of our own 
making. This does not mean that such things are any less meaningful, only that we 
must find the source of their meaningfulness in our interest in valuing those things 
we care about, injecting the argument with a healthy dose of modesty and 
moderation.293 As Thomas Nagel pointedly articulates,  
 
philosophical skepticism does not cause us to abandon our ordinary 
beliefs, but it lends them a peculiar flavor. After acknowledging that their 
truth is incompatible with possibilities that we have no grounds for 
believing do not obtain – apart from grounds in those very beliefs which 
we have called into question – we return to our familiar convictions with 
a certain irony and resignation.294 
 
The irony of the valuative approach does not mean that it is relativistic in its 
promotion of values or flippant in employing punishment against those who 
undermine the interest in valuation. The evil of criminal wrongdoing, it tells us, is 
concrete; but it is also ultimately a matter of perception, not of essence. Correcting 
the damage done by wrongdoing is not in any way unique to punishment. As long 
as punishment is genuinely aimed at the affirmation of valuation, it needs no further 
justification. However, we must also consider whether, in any given case, it is the 
most appropriate and effective way of reaffirming the meaning assigned to the 
flouted values.295 
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These insights have an immediate bearing on the potential criminalization of 
abortion. Once we construct the question, as the Roe Court did, as one that concerns 
the potential harm the act of abortion might cause to protected social values, we must 
treat it differently than we would actions that threaten to undermine the valuative 
efforts of others directly. This does not rule out the legitimate prohibition of 
abortion, for its negative effect on social values might indirectly affect others; but 
we must be cautious not to think it wrongful for its flouting of values simpliciter. 
Accordingly, when we come to assess whether, in any given case, the prohibition of 
abortion is justified, we must first of all inquire whether it is genuinely aimed at the 
support of the individual faculty of valuation, or whether it sacrifices the individuals 
involved in the name of fantastic values that are divorced from their human creators. 
 
